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ROBERT HOCKETT*

ABSTRACT

Three facts bear notice in connection with our current financial
troubles. The first is that the First World War, before the Second began,
was known as "the Great War." The second is that the global Depression
that struck between those two wars-which, thankfully, it appears we can
still label "Great" for the time being-commenced with the burst of a
multiyear real estate price bubble prior to the 1929 stock market crash.
The third is that the United States accordingly addressed that depression

through mutually reinforcingnew regimes not only offinancial regulation,
but also of home mortgage finance-the very reforms that brought us
"securitization" and the familiar thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage. Our
present difficulties, moreover, stem directly from recent departuresfrom
that originally bipartisanpackage of mutually reinforcing mortgage and
finance-regulatoryinnovations.
Approaches to today's financial crisis have been strangely unmindful
of the history, innovations, and bipartisanshipjust mentioned. They have
also been inattentive to the well-established historical linkage between
protracted economic contractions on the one hand, and pairedstock and
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Shiller, Laura Underkuffler, and the editors for helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks also to
participants in the 2009 Cornell Law School Faculty Retreat, the 2009 Yale Law School Corporate
Law Roundtable, the University of Iowa College of Law Faculty Workshop, the Notre Dame Law
School Faculty Workshop, and the 2010 University of Chicago Lumen ChristiConference of Catholic
Economists for stimulating discussion and helpful suggestions.
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real estate crashes on the other. That is surprisingnot only because these
matters are so salient right now. It is surprisingalso because the reason
for the historical link between real estate slumps and broader economic
contractions is not hard to find. For the overwhelming majority of
Americans, homes are by far the most valuable assets they own. When
their values plummet, wealth, credit, consumer confidence, and spending
soon follow. The lesson for today is quite clear: No approach to our
present financial crisis that does not address the mortgage crisis at its
core can succeed in the long run, or even the short run.
This Article prescribesmeans of addressingour currentfinancial crisis
by addressingthe mortgage crisis at its core. It targets both the short and
the long term. In a manner that is sensitive both to the historicalroots and
to the still operative etiology of the current crisis, it develops a fully
integrated,systematicprotocolfor treatingour presentfinancialills.
The Article first structurally characterizes the nature of credit-fueled
asset price bubbles and the financialpathologies to which they give rise. It
emphasizes that this structure is compatible both with long-term
informational efficiency on the part of asset markets, and with individual
rationalityon the part of market participants. The challengepresented by
asset bubbles, the Article argues, is not individual irrationality or
informational inefficiency, but a classic coordinationproblem. Mistaken
assumptions to the contrary account in large measure for our failure to
have prevented, andfor our ineffectiveness thus far in addressing, the
present crisis. Coordination problems require coordinative responses.
Absent such responses to credit cycles andfinancialsystems conceived as
wholes, piecemeal regulatory measures cannot properly discharge their
functions.
The Article next shows our current difficulties indeed to have stemmed
from a classic credit-fueledasset price bubblefirst in the stock, then in the
housing markets over the decade ending in 2006. This bubble was
strikingly reminiscent both of that which preceded the 1928-29 American
real estate and stock market crashes and ensuing deflation, and of more
recent such stories in Asia. The Article then lays out responsive near-term
solutions to the present crisis as thus characterized,followed by longerterm measures that will maintain health both in real estatefinance and in
thefinancialsystem more generally. The key to a short-term solution lies
in employing those institutions we first put into place to deal with our last
great real estate bubble and burst, that of 1928. Those institutions are the
Federal Housing Administration and its recently renationalized GSE
siblings, FannieMae andFreddieMac.
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The key to longer-term maintenance, the Article then argues, is twofold. Above all, we must restore the Federal Reserve's original role as
bubble-preventive credit-regulator-whatthe Article calls "regulation as
modulation." Complementary to this task will be the development of more
effective bubble-detection methodologies, which can be developed but, as
public goods, are currently underprovided. Likewise complementary to
credit modulation will be the extension offamiliar disclosure andfirewall
protections from those older fields of finance where they have been
operative since the 1930s, to new fields of finance that have developed
more recently in the shadows. Getting finance and the credit-debt cycle
right, the Article concludes, will get the business cycle and stable growth
right as well. Stop bubbles, and we will stop bursts anddeflations alike.
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I. INTRODUCTION: REAL ESTATE, RECESSION, AND KEEPING THE GREAT
DEPRESSION "GREAT"

Unnerving though it is to recall them right now, three facts bear noting
in connection with our present financial troubles. The first is that the First
World War, before the Second commenced, was popularly known as "the
Great War." The second is that the 1930s-era global Depression we can
still thankfully call "Great" began with the burst of a multiyear asset price
bubble in the American real estate, then stock markets.' The third is that
we addressed this depression most effectively by developing what, at the
time, were remarkably innovative, mutually reinforcing new systems of
mortgage finance and financial regulation.2 Both the Hoover and
Roosevelt Administrations designed these systems to operate in tandem.3
Together they brought us not only those familiar forms of bank and
securities regulation still largely operative today and well recognized to be
products of their era, but also securitization and the familiar thirty-year,

1. See, e.g., FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE
NINETEEN-TWENTIES 234-50 (1931); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 3-7
(1954); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY
OF FINANCIAL CRISES 117-21 (5th ed. 2005). Our present woes issue from a story in which this
order-real estate, then stock-is simply reversed, we shall see.
2. See infra Part II.
3. Id.
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fixed-rate mortgage--curiously less widely recognized today to stem from
that era.4
Some or all of these observations might come as news to nonexperts. In
the received telling, the tale of the 1930s depression places the stock
market crash of October 1929 center stage, with a nod perhaps given the
bank runs of 1932 and Roosevelt's "bank holiday" of March 1933. 5 Real
estate and mortgage finance seldom find their way into the story at all. At
best they receive rare passing mention-along with flappers, jazz, and
raccoon coats-as token emblems of those excesses routinely catalogued
under the heady rubric of "The Roaring 20s. ' '6
But emphasis on the role of real estate finance in the 1930s depression
will not surprise many financial historians or central bankers. It is a virtual
commonplace among these that the worst, most protracted economic
slumps-including most recently those in Japan and the rest of East
Asia-typically emerge from conjoined stock and real estate crashes.7
Why might that be? The principal reason is right under our noses: Homes
are, in most developed economies, by far the most valuable assets most
people own and borrow against;8 when they plummet in value or are lost in
foreclosure, personal wealth, credit, purchasing power, and consumer
confidence rapidly follow. 9 Stock and bond portfolios, as most citizens'

4. The standard introductory textbooks on financial institutions and markets speak of
securitization almost as something that emerged spontaneously in the 1990s, rather than by statutory
design in the 1930s. See, e.g., FRANK FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

AND MARKETS (3d ed. 2002); MEIR G. KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS (2d ed. 2003).
By way of what I hope is a refreshing contrast, see ROBERT HOCKE*r, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2010). See also
Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by HamiltonianMeans: Values, Constraints,and Financein
the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American "Ownership Society," 79 S. CAL. L.
REv. 45 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, A JeffersonianRepublic by Hamiltonian Means].
5. The "bank run" scene of Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life is particularly popular for these
purposes. I myself use it in teaching Financial Regulation. Much more such footage is on view at the
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. It is telling-and gratifying to a finance professor-to
note that among the many accomplishments of the first Roosevelt Administration touted on campaign
flyers during the 1936 reelection campaign now on display at that library, upwards of half are financeregulatory in nature.
6. See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 1, at 3-8 (a droll and revealing, if not altogether systematic,
case in point).
7. Asia is not alone here. It is noteworthy that all of the most conspicuous financial crises of
recent decades critically involved stocks and real estate together. These include the cases of Japan in
the late 1980s and early 1990s; Sweden and Mexico in the middle 1990s; Thailand, Singapore, and
South Korea in the late 1990s; Argentina at the turn of the millennium; and now the U.S. See, e.g.,
KINDLEBERGER & ALtBER, supra note 1, at 142-64; see also Jean-Claude Trichet, President, Eur.
Cent. Bank, Mas Lecture: Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy, available at http://www.ecb.int/
press/key/date/2005/html/sp050608.en.html (last visited May 18, 2010) [hereinafter ECB Speech].
8. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 117-21; ECB Speech, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1; see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
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distantly second most valuable asset holdings, simply amplify the waves
generated by real estate fluctuation.1 0 Scarce wonder, then, that the Hoover
and Roosevelt Administrations addressed our last, "Great" depression
through a package of mutually complementary mortgage-finance and
finance-regulatory reforms. 1
Against this well-established historical backdrop, it was perplexing, in
late 2008 and much of 2009, to find the principal national and global
responses to our recent financial woes boasting every stratagem but that of
forthrightly arresting our real estate crash and attendant foreclosure
crisis. 12 Real estate seemed to be taken by most for a mere side show or
sadly peripheral "human interest story"-something like the 1930s-era
bread lines or Steinbeck novels-rather than central to our broader
national and transnational financial turmoil. In consequence, our
governments seemed to be fiddling, with no discernible melody, while a
great city burned: the city of Hoover- and Roosevelt-designed mortgage
finance and financial regulation, which made the United States, in large
part, a nation of homeowners and stockholders. 3
What, then, have we been doing? Congress and the White House first
agreed on a stopgap financial "bailout" plan early in October 2008.14 The
so-called "Troubled Asset Relief Plan" (TARP; the Plan) was remarkable
in several respects. As a fiscal matter, the Plan's sheer size-over $700
billion, with no assurance that this would be all-was unprecedented in
both real and nominal terms. 5 As a legal matter, the sheer breadth of
barely reviewable discretion that the TARP afforded Treasury pressed
hard against constitutional limits on executive branch authority. 6 Lawyers

EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE]; ROBERT J. SHILLER,
THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO

ABOUT IT (2008) [hereinafter SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION].
10. For more on American patterns of securities ownership, see Robert Hockett, What Kinds of
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies," 92
CORNELL L. REV. 865 (2007).
11. See infra Part IMl.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. One might even call this "city" an "ownership society." See, e.g., infra Part IV.A; see also
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4; Robert Hockett, Whose
Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005).
14. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
15. Adjusted to 2008 dollars, the S&L cleanup cost $150 billion. See, e.g., CHARLES R. MORRIS,
THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT

CRASH 83 (2008).
16. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Some Ask If Bailout Is Constitutional,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at
Al6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16challenge.html; see also Fabius
Maximus, Legal experts discuss if the Paulson Plan is legal, Sept. 21, 2008, http://fabiusmaximus.
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seemed widely agreed that the original, three-page version of the TARP
delegated authority far in excess of constitutional limits. 7 The amended,
400-page version-at least "as applied" to the crisis--did not fare much
better. For at least as striking as the TARP's fiscal scale and delegated
executive scope was the remarkably restless, if not capricious, character of
actions taken under the Plan after enactment.
Secretary Paulson originally pitched the TARP in September 2008 as a
proposed "buy-up" of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), said to be
clogging the credit markets. 18 That, we shall see, was a worthwhile aimbut it was quickly abandoned. Paulson next began speaking, in midOctober of 2008, of "buying-in" to troubled financial institutions by
purchasing nonvoting shares in them. 19 Paulson held that the equity
injection strategy would render lendable funds more quickly available to
lenders, restoring liquidity to credit markets more expeditiously than the
original buy-up plan.20 By early November, Treasury reported that the

wordpress.com/2008/09/21/paulson-plan/ (cataloguing some of the many weblog entries by law
professors at the time of the bailout bill discussions).
17. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at Cl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23sorkin.html?scp=l&sq-troubled%20
asset%20relief'/o20&%20september/o202008&st-cse; Posting of David Zaring to The Conglomerate,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 2008/09/the-bailout-sta.html (Sept. 20, 2008); Posting of Eric Posner
to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ archives/archive_2008_09_14-2008_09_20.shtml#122
1958868 (Sept. 20, 2008, 22:01 EST); Posting of Eric Posner to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_09_14-2008_09 20.shtml#1221830018 (Sept. 19, 2008,
10:13 EST); Posting of Lawrence R. Velvel to Commondreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/
view/2008/09/19-0 (Sept. 19, 2008).
18. Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities,
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2008), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_
files/PAULSONTestimony92308.pdf (statement of Henry J. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the United
States Treasury).
19. Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/business/12imf.html?scp=3&
sq--troubled%20asset/o20relief/o20&%20october/o202008&st=cse.
20. Id. Not so, per the institutionally sensitive "financial accelerator" and "credit rationing"
accounts of financial institutions developed by monetary economists in recent decades. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & BRUCE C.N. GREENWALD, TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN MONETARY
ECONOMICS (2003); Ben Bermanke & Mark Gertler, Banking and Macroeconomic Equilibrium, in
NEW APPROACHES TO MONETARY ECONOMICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS 89 (William A. Barnett & Kenneth J.

Singleton eds., 1987); Ben Bemanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 14 (1989); Ben Bemanke & Mark Gertler, Financial Fragility and
Economic Performance, 105 Q.J. ECON. 87 (1990); Ben Bemanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist,
The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV. ECON. STAT. 1 (1996); Joseph E. Stiglitz
& Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393
(1981).
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buy-in plan would entirely supplant the earlier buy-up plan.21
In mid-November, however, Treasury announced it would enter the
short-term debt markets as well, once again "buying-up" rather than just
"buying-in." 22 Then, near the end of November, the plan changed again.
Now Treasury would resume purchasing "toxic" assets, but more kinds
than MBSs. 23 Finally, in December 2008, talk turned toward employing
TARP moneys to tide over automakers as well, a course of action that, by
early 2009, had begun to be taken.24 And so things have more or less
continued to the present, even since a new Treasury's taking of the reins to
spend from the final installment of TARP funds, and subsequently to
recoup many of those funds from their original recipients.
Throughout all of these pivots and changes of direction, a few voices
softer than Treasury's were offering proposals that targeted the proximate
cause of our present financial distress.25 That, as suggested a moment ago,
is our recently corrupted system of home mortgage finance. In particular,
it is the ongoing foreclosure crisis afflicting our post-bubble real estate
markets. 26 With time and continued tumult, these proposals-which are
much better focused as a financial matter, and less constitutionally
troubling as a legal matter than TARP was thought by many to be-have
come gradually to be more widely heard.27 Now, even President Obama,

21. More on Henry Paulson's Bailout Update, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/
henry-paulsons-bailout-update/?scp=44&sq--troubled%20asset%20reieO%2&%20novmber/o2208
&st-cse (Nov. 12, 2008, 11:15 EST).
22. Edmund L. Andrews, US. Shifts Focus in CreditBailout to the Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/1 l/13/business/economy/13bailout.html?
scp=4&sq=troubled%20asset/o20relieP/o20&%20novmber/o202008&st=cse.
23. Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target with $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at BU4,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/economy/21view.html?scp=46&sq--troub
led%20asset/o20reliefP/o20&%20novmber/o202008&st-cse; Jeff Zeleny, Obama and Bush Working to
Calm Volatile Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at AI, availableat http://www. nytimes.com/2008/
11/25/us/politics/25obama.html?scp=45&sq-troubled%2asset%2relie/20&%20novmber%2208

&st=cse.
24. See Posting of Steven M. Davidofff to Dealbook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008
/12/09/the-new-auto-bailout-bilt/?scp=7&sq=automobile%2O
manufaturers%20bailout&st=cse (Dec.
9, 2008, 9:56 EST).
25. See infra note 26.
26. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard & Chris Mayer, First,Let's Stabilize Home Prices, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 2008, at Al9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122291076983796813.html;
Democracy Now!: "Bridge Loan to Nowhere" (television broadcast Sept. 30, 2008), available at
http://www. democracynow.org/2008/9/30/bridgeloan to nowherehouserejects; Democracy Now!:
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz: Bail Out Wall Street Now, Change Terms Later (television broadcast
Oct. 2, 2008), availableat http://www.democracynow.org/2008/10/2/nobellaureatejoseph_sfiglitz_
bailout wall; Posting of Robert Hockett to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2008/09/treasurysplanned-bailout-is-fhas.html (Sept. 25, 2008, 14:33 EST).
27. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at
36; see also Blinder, supra note 23, at 1;SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 9; John D.
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Federal Reserve (Fed) Chair Bernanke, and Treasury Secretary Geithner
pay at least lip service to the need of a bottom to falling mortgage
markets-and to2 spend some of the original and since-recovered TARP
moneys to do so.

8

It is very good news that now, more are looking to stemming
foreclosures as means of addressing our wider financial crisis. 29 However
badly needed the transfusion supplied by the first stages of TARP might
have been to keep the "patients" (our banks and other financial
institutions) alive on the table, the fact is that these patients-and the
Treasury-can be expected to continue to "bleed" until we at last stanch
the flow, and the threat, of foreclosures still facing us. The only real
question is how best to do that. The question of how to end our financial
crisis, in short, boils down in significant part to the question of how to end
our mortgage crisis-and to prevent a recurrence.
This Article aims to address those two questions head on, just as the
late Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations did-as a package. It supplies
an integrated set of short-term and longer-term answers, rooted in careful
structural and historical diagnosis of our present ills.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II first elaborates the
aforementioned diagnosis. In particular, it shows that we are indeed
coming off of a causally interconnected pair of tech stock and real estate
bubbles. The real estate bubble in particular was one which,
notwithstanding the assurances of former Fed Chairman Greenspan to the
contrary, could be seen in the making even as it was inflating-hence,
could have been stopped. 30 Like other bubbles, moreover, this one's
growth was compatible with market efficiency and individual rationality.
Indeed, in the presence of historically low and, at times, even negative real

Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Op-Ed., Mortgage Justice Is Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at
John D.
A39, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/opinion/30geanakoplos.html;
Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Why the Blind Trustee Plan is Cheaper and Better than Alternatives
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/docu
ments/pdf/cbVKoniakBlindTrustee.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010); George M. Cohen, Susan P.
Koniak & John D. Geankoplos, Mortgage and Securities Stabilization, Recovery and Modification
Program Act of 2009, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/KoniakMortgageSecurities.pdf
(last visited May 18, 2010). For a welcome indication that the Obama administration might now be
poised to take the mortgage problem at the root of our broader financial difficulties more seriously,
see, e.g., Renae Merle, Geithner Tells Panel That More Has to Be Done to Help Homeowners Avoid
Foreclosure, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2010, available at http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904769.html.

28. See Merle, supranote 27.
29.

See id.

30. See, e.g., Tim lacono, Shame on You CNN/Money!, May 23, 2005, http://themessthatgreen
spanmade.blogspot.com/2005105/shame-on-you-cnnmoney_23.html.
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interest rates maintained by the Fed, the bubble was practically guaranteed
by those forms of market efficiency and individual rationality. Widespread
confusion on these points-on bubbles' compatibility with market
efficiency and individual rationality-Part II argues, accounts for our
failures both to have prevented the recent tech stock and real estate
bubbles, and for our failure effectively to manage their inevitable
collapses. 3
Part III begins the transition to the question of how we should manage
the mentioned collapse in the short term. It briefly reprises the story of the
paired stock and real estate bubbles of the late 1920s, then that of how the
Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations dealt with the fallout once that pair
of bubbles had burst. In particular, it highlights the role of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) (established 1932 and 1934), as well as their recently
renationalized government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) sibling, Fannie
Mae (established 1938), in reversing the plunge and stabilizing housing
markets thereafter. That was an absolute prerequisite to arresting the Great
Depression itself-it set a firm floor.
Part III also briefly reprises, in broad outline, the complementary
system of broader financial regulation put into place during those yearsthe Banking Acts of 1932 and 1933, the Securities and Securities
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Investment Company and
Investment Advisors Acts of 1940. It emphasizes the sense in which this
regime constituted one seamless web that critically complemented the new
system of mortgage finance put into place in those years. Part III also
emphasizes how departuresfrom that delicately balanced regime since the
1990s have been nothing less than returns to that late 1920s world, whose
crashing and burning necessitated the system's establishment by Hoover
and Roosevelt in the first place.
Part IV turns from the lessons of the recent and not-so-recent past to
the needs of the present. It lays out both short-term and long-term
remedies for our present afflictions. It first prescribes how to employ the
FHA and its newly renationalized siblings Fannie and Freddie to stabilize
and restore value to the housing and, thereby, the securities markets, just
as they did from the 1930s to the late 1990s. 32 It then prescribes an

31. 1 elaborate this point in Part 1l.A. The short-playing version is that, in view of the theoretical
attractions and empirical corroborations of bounded rationality and markets' informational efficiency,
anything thought incompatible with these phenomena is thought impossible. It is the premise shared by
these thoughts-the incompatibility-that has been erroneous.
32. Technically, Freddie was founded in 1970 to compete with Fannie. But I shall occasionally
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integrated sequence of incremental updatings that must be made to our
system of financial regulation conceived as a whole, to address new risks
occasioned by new forms of finance developed in the past decade.
Fragmented, piecemeal financial regulation is not viable in a world of fastpaced financial innovation and integrated financial services.33 The
regulatory web must be seamless. Above all, it must afford means of
modulating the ever potentially violent swings of the debt-credit cycle.34
Each of the updatings urged in this Article constitutes either a
restoration, or a straightforward and minimal extension to currently
unregulated sub-industries, of some familiar and uncontroversial mode of
regulation that served very well from the 1930s until recently. In that
sense, this Article urges less radical change than a return to who, not long
ago, we were. On that note, Part V then concludes and looks forward.
II. THIS OLD HOUSE'S CRACKED FOUNDATIONS: WHERE WE ARE AND
How WE GOT HERE
There no longer seems to be serious doubt that asset price bubbles can
occur, or that the United States is now in the midst of a very large stock,
and then real estate, bubble's collapse. 35 Nor does anyone seem now to
doubt that the United States' and world financial systems' present woes
are somehow rooted in that two-staged collapse.36 Where most
disagreement persists is in respect of two ancillary questions.
The first of those questions is whether anything can be done about asset
price bubbles. Some still maintain that euphoric asset price rises-like

lump the two institutions together in speaking of the pre-1970 regime for simplicity's sake. For more
on this history, see infra Part IH.
33. This is one continuing thread of HOCKETr, FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 4.

34. For more on this cycle-a staple of the venerable monetary theories of Wicksell, Fisher,
Keynes, Schumpeter, and Minsky, as well as of the more recent theories of Bemanke and Gertler on
the one hand, and Stiglitz and Greenwald on the other-see infra Part HI.
35. There is a history of belief that market efficiency precludes asset bubbles, hence that one
must believe in one or the other, not both. See, e.g., the views of Eugene Fama, one of the principal
developers of the ECMH, on the impossibility of bubbles. Interview by Douglas Clement with Eugene
Fama (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapers/pub-display.
cfm?id=l134; Interview by John Cassidy with Eugene Fama (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html. Not so, as I
will argue below. The informational efficiency widely thought to be characteristic of liquid capital
markets--be it the so-called "strong," "semi-strong," or "weak" form of which one speaks-is quite
compatible with the presence of asset bubbles, just as it is with consumer price inflation. The reason is
that bubbles grow around a Knightian form of uncertainty. There simply is not information in this case
of the sort that can find expression in asset prices.
36. But see the peculiar views of Eugene Fama, supra note 35.
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those in the values of tech stocks, then U.S. residential real estate-from
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s cannot be foreseen or avoided.37
The second question is whether addressing the ongoing mortgage crisis
is the best means-or even an effective means--of defusing the ongoing,
now much more generalized, financial crisis and downturn we are
experiencing. Some argue that the problem has spread so far outward that
mortgage foreclosures no longer matter.38
This Part argues that these two questions should be buried, along with
those earlier questions concerning the possibility of asset bubbles in
general and the actuality of a now-deflating real estate bubble, in
particular. It first briefly schematizes the structure of that process through
which asset price bubbles typically develop, inflate, and then burst. This
structure, it argues, is that of a classic collective action problem. The
process it structures is therefore compatible with individual rationality and
aggregative market-informational efficiency. 39 The process is also
structured in such a way that, no matter how many derivative financial
contracts might be drawn into the vortex during an asset price's collapse,
the underlying asset itself remains always the best lever through which to
arrest the collapse.4 °
After structurally characterizing the nature of asset price bubbles and
bursts, Part II quickly sketches the conforming structure of our recent tech
stock and housing price bubbles. It shows them to be "textbook cases" of
that schema laid out in its first section. Finally, and relatedly, this Part
shows both how readily verifiable the presence of our recent bubble was,
and how critical it is to address its aftermath now if we would forestall a
very long, 1930s-style downturn. That will set the stage for the short-term
and long-term "home repairs," elaborated later in the Article.

37. See, e.g., Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector Before the Committee of Senate
CongressionalOversight Panel, Jan. 14, 2009 (statement of Marc Summerlin, Managing Member and
Co-Founder, Lindsey Group), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/news/2901951.html; see
also Joe Average, Collateral Damage, Oct. 2007, http://www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_05/swagell
100707.html.
38. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End

Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169
431617549947.html.
39. This is not to say there was no irrationality or inefficiency in our recent bubble and burst. It is
only to say that one need not deny rationality or efficiency to assert the occurrence of bubbles and
bursts. That is important because many who have failed to see bubbles' development appear to have
willfully blinded themselves to such developments, out of a mistaken belief that rationality and
efficiency, which these folk are at pains to affirm, somehow exclude bubbles and bursts.
40. See infra Part IV.A.
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A. Bubbles Happen: Of Beautiful Babies, Ponzi Processes,and Minsky
Moments
Even if few now deny that speculative asset bubbles can occur, it is
nevertheless crucial to understand how they occur. That not only renders
us more confident that they can occur, but also well situates us to spot
future such bubbles ahead of their forming. More importantly, it enables
us to see how to prevent them and, just as importantly, how to minimize
the devastation wrought by their deflations when they nevertheless come
and go.
1. Beautiful Babies: UnderlyingAssets, Overlying Valuations
To understand how speculative asset bubbles can and do happen, the
first thing to note is a defining feature of speculative assets themselves, as
contrasted to goods and services meant for consumption. In ordinary
markets for consumer goods and services, pricing typically conforms to
the familiar "laws" of supply and demand.4' Consumers buy more, sellers
receive that "demand signal," and prices begin to go up. Prices go up,
consumers and producers receive that "price signal," and thus begin to
consume less, produce more, or both. Consumers consume less or
producers produce more, and prices turn back down. And so on, ad
tedium.
The trend is the thing in this picture-the axis along which the
oscillations occur. The system, in general, tends toward an equilibrium
price at which supply and demand coincide and the markets thus clear.42
That is the case even if the market-clearing price is, in some cases, an oftmoving target-owing, for example, to regular changes in tastes or
production cost functions.4 3 The point is the equilibrating tendency.
Speculative assets, as distinguished from consumed goods and services,
do not generally conform to the primitive equilibrium model, familiar to
price theory, just rehearsed. Even if under some circumstances--or for
certain intervals over an individual's demand function-one's demand for
an asset inversely correlates to its price, under other circumstances or over
41. It is, of course, telling that goods that thus conform are called "normal goods." There are, of
course, abnormal goods, but these will not detain us here. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE
TtEORY: A PROVISIONAL TExT (1962); GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed.

1966). Or see any introductory or intermediate text on what now is more often called
"microeconomics."
42. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41; STIGLER, Supra note 41.
43.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 41; STIGLER, supra note 41.
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other intervals, that demand can be an increasing function of price. The
circumstances and intervals in question are not hard to see; if the asset
looks to be all the time rising in value, and the prospective buyer is doing
the looking, the buyer can at some point begin to demand more of the asset
precisely because she anticipates further such rises in market value. In
such cases she acts as a would-be rentier. She is after rents or quasi-rents,
rather than inexpensive consumption.
During times of protracted inflation, such as those experienced by the
United States during the late 1960s and 1970s, these "inflationary
expectations" (as they then came canonically to be called) can, of course,
induce greater purchase rates even of consumer goods and services, rather
than solely of durable assets.44 Indeed, it is individually rational for
consumers to stock up on such goods, and to bring forward their plans to
consume such services, in these circumstances. That is precisely why
periods of consumer price inflation are so vexing. They are "prisoner's
dilemma"-type situations; individual rationality and collective optimality
diverge in them. One point I shall emphasize below is that speculative
asset bubbles need be no different; they, too, are collective dysfunctions
built up on nonpathological individual functions--demand functions. They
are cases of rational-expectations-fueled price inflation.
Now, in the interest of strengthening the comparison just offered, we
should note that there is a sense in which behavior undertaken in explicit
response to inflationary expectations is "speculative," even when the items
procured are goods and services purchased for consumption. One is in
such cases, after all, making money-spending decisions "on spec"-on
speculation that the items in question will continue to rise in price. But this
manner of positive price-elasticity of demand tends nevertheless to be
naturally limited by either the limited shelf-lives, space required for
stockpiling, or other costs occasioned by storing the items in question
when those items are not durable assets, but consumer goods. Moreover
and relatedly, apart from periods of consumer "hyperinflation," most
purchases of goods and services in these inflationary-expectations
situations are made with a view still to consuming in the future that which
is purchased, rather than turning a profit through sale.
The hallmark of a "pure" speculative asset price bubble, then, is just
this: Here the price inflation in question has indeed morphed into

44. See, e.g., GEORGE W. EvANs & SEPPO HONKAPOHJA, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS IN

MACROECONOMICS (2001). The same effect is discernible, of course, in markets for consumer goods
during times of consumer inflation. Those who "stock up" on canned soup while prices are rising are
seeking to be soup-rentiers.
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"hyperinflation," and the asset in question is easily stored for much later
use or, more likely, for resale.4 5 The purchaser thus purchases not with a
view simply to saving herself a few future costs occasioned by items she
plans in the short or the medium term to consume, but with a view
expressly to realizing money profits or capital gains. The speculative and
consumption motives for purchase no longer meld in these cases. The
motive is "pure speculation," undertaken with a view to realizing
pecuniary gains.
Now, in some of these cases, the gains in question might still be hoped
to inhere in the assets themselves, which might be durable, readily
retained, and such as to render their owners more pleased or proud when
they grow in value. In other cases, the purchaser might enjoy something
like that which economists call "wealth" effects wrought by appreciation
of speculative assets-effects which can spill into the broader economy
through many channels, e.g., greater "consumer confidence" and
consequent willingness to spend on the part of the newly wealthy, or a
greater amount of secured debt that the new wealth can attract. 6
But more often than not, the gains that are sought during speculative
asset price rises are the margins between purchase and sale prices that
people aim to recoup by reselling precisely that which they purchase. In
the realm of real estate, this category of market participant would include,
for example, those who intend to "flip" homes, rather than reside in or take
"reverse" mortgages on them for purposes of consumption.4 7 It is people
with this sort of aim-the "pure speculators"-who add the most fuel to
our speculative asset price bubbles as the portion of trading behavior they
account for grows 4 8 For their aim is to profit precisely by, in effect,
betting on the trading behavior of other market participants, thus
amplifying effects upon prices wrought by those people.

45. There can, of course, also be borderline cases. The tulip bulbs figuring into the Dutch
"Tulipmania," for example, were easily stored while their prices continued to rise. Purchasers,
moreover, could "consume"-retain, plant, and grow-some of their acquisitions, while selling the
remainder or holding on to them with a view to selling later. On this particular mania, see CHARLES
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841), a classic on
the subject. For a more recent telling, see ANNE GOLDGAR, TULIPMANIA: MONEY, HONOR, AND
KNOWLEDGE IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (2007).
46. See, e.g., ERIC BELSKY & JOEL PRAKKEN, HOUSING WEALTH EFFECTS: HOUSING'S IMPACT
ON WEALTH ACCUMULATION, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMER SPENDING (2004), available at
http://www.j chs.harvard.edu/publications/fmance/w04-13.pdf.

47. 1 shall say more about "flipping" below. Sizeable numbers of people-including savvy
undergraduates at elite universities--began purchasing homes with a view to quick resale in the early
2000s.
48.

See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBAR, supra note 1, at 37.
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John Maynard Keynes, a man who made multiple fortunes on, and
never ceased to be, fascinated by securities markets, appears to have been
one of the first economists proper to have singled out that feature of
speculative asset markets to which I am drawing attention. 49 He likened
such markets to the "Beautiful Baby" contests run in his day by the British
press. 50 In such contests, a newspaper would publish the photographs of a
number of candidate children. Readers were asked to vote upon those
babies they thought most "beautiful." Those who had voted on photos that
received the most votes would then win prizes.5 1 It did not take long,
Keynes observed, for players to cease voting for babies whom they
themselves actually found beautiful.5 2 They commenced voting instead for
the babies whom they reckoned others would find beautiful.
If the aim is to win prizes, of course, this is the rational thing for the
voter to do. That fact bears noting because it affords means of readily
seeing how asset price bubbles may develop even in informationally
efficient markets whose actors are individually rational.5 3
In effect, with the "Beautiful Baby" analogy, Keynes was underscoring
an analogue to what is now often labeled the elusive distinction between
"real," long-term, "fundamental" values of market-traded assets on the one
hand-the sort of value extolled not so long ago by Benjamin Graham,
and extolled to this day by Graham's best-known disciple, Warren
Buffett54-and more ephemeral, even whimsical, "market" values on the
other. Some people appear to believe that these two takes on value are

49. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936). 1 say "economist proper" because others prior to Keynes, who wrote before there was
any distinct discipline known as "economics," also have noted these features of speculative asset
bubbles. See, e.g., JOSEPH DE LA VEGA, CONFUSItN DE CONFUSIONES (1688) (on the speculative
excesses of seventeenth-century Amsterdam exchanges).
Until relatively recent years, and even to a certain degree now, there has been a regrettable divide
between so-called "economics" on the one hand, and so-called "finance" on the other. A vestige of that
divide is the continuing tendency of financial economists to be found mainly in business schools, with
economists in colleges of arts and science. The former were long disparaged as "vocational" types by
the latter. That began to change with the burgeoning of sophisticated financial decision making and
price models in the 1970s. The new regime received an imprimatur of sorts when financial economists
began winning Nobel prizes in the 1990s. Keynes-and, to a certain extent, Hicks-were ahead of
their time as economists in their taking seriously the institutional and structural features of financial
markets as determinants of economic performance. See J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY
INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1939); KEYNES, supra note 49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

See KEYNES, supra note 49, at 156.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

54.

See

BENJAMIN

GRAHAM,

SECURITY

ANALYSIS

(1962);

BENJAMIN

GRAHAM,

THE

INTELLIGENT INVESTOR: A BOOK OF PRACTICAL COUNSEL (1959); see also ALICE SCHROEDER, THE
SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFErr AND THE BUSINESS OF LIFE (2008).
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radically incompatible, and to eschew the idea of "fundamental" value in
consequence. 55 That, in turn, leads them to think that a speculative asset
price bubble-which is always the product of "market," not "fundamental"
value-is either impossible or undetectable.56 But those who view things
this way simply suffer, I think, a confusion concerning the relation
between individual rationality on the one hand, and the institutions
through which rational actions aggregate into collective outcomes on the
other.57 Let me explain.
It can of course be difficult, at any particular moment, to draw sharp
and clear lines between "market" and "fundamental" value. That is so just
as "manias" for things like tulips can straddle the divide between
consumer and asset price inflation,5 8 and as thinkers as clever as the
classical political economists could find themselves sometimes puzzling
between what used to be called "use" and
over how to distinguish
"exchange" value.5 9 This same difficulty of clear line-drawing is also the
reason why there can so often be controversy over whether financial
institutions' asset portfolios should be required to be regularly "marked-tomarket" on the one hand, or "book-valued," "discounted cashflowvalued," or otherwise less "mood-swingingly" valued on the other.60
Nevertheless, I shall argue, the distinction is tractable in principle, as
well as in regulatory practice. And it is important, for purposes of

55. See, e.g., sources cites supra note 35. See generally Robert D. Coleman, Evolution of Stock
Pricing,2006, http://www.numeraire.com/download/EvolutionStockPricing.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Greenspan, supra note 18; see also supra notes 35, 37. Greenspan, for his part,
attributes the view also to Robert Rubin, President Clinton's second Treasury Secretary. See ALAN
GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 218 (2007).

57.
theories
text.
58.
59.

More careful attention to such institutions is the hallmark of so-called "new institutional"
of monetary and financial economics, such as those cited supra note 20 and accompanying
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 61 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776);

DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33 (Cosimo Classics 2006)

(1817).
60. See, e.g., Steve Forbes, Obama Repeats Bush's Worst Market Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,
2009, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123630304198047321.html; Floyd Norris,
Bankers Say Rules Are the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at Bl, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/l3/business/economy/13norris.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting, No.
2008-234 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm; Brooke Colin
Barr, Fair Value: The Pragmatic Solution, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 21, 2008, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/l 1/2 l/news/fair.value.compromise.fortune/index.htm?postversion=200811
21(9http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/21/news/fair.value.com; Sopelsa, Former FDIC Chair Blames
SECfor Credit Crunch, CNBC.COM, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/27100454. I
shall recommend that a "basket" of valuation methods be employed simultaneously, at least for
regulatory purposes. See discussion infra Part IV.B.

1230

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:1213

understanding the dynamics, inner workings, and regulatability of
speculative asset bubbles, to be mindful both of the distinction and of the
linkage connecting its terms. For it is precisely by tracking short- to
medium-term divergences between apparent fundamental value as
measured by reference to solid information on the one hand, and more
volatile market value as determined in part by mere rumor and "herd
behavior" in the face of uncertainty on the other, that regulators can spot
bubbles forming and shrink them before they grow contagiously
dangerous.
How, then, should we think of, then track, this distinction? For the
present, it will be useful to think of the relation between the two aspects of
value under the single aspect of this simile: "Fundamental" value is like
heavy liquid at the bottom of a flask. "Market" value is then like a lighter
liquid that lies over it. Movements of the lighter fluid cannot help but be
affected by movements of the heavier, nor can they help but be partly
anchored by the inertial forces exerted by the latter. But movements of the
lighter fluid also are prone to be brought on independently of, as well as
more readily than, movements of the former, and can persist for a time
before being slowed by the slower-moving liquid beneath. More forces, in
short-even rumors and whims--can move the lighter stuff for brief
periods, and can move it more frequently and further.
The light versus heavy liquid simile proves helpful, on reflection,
because an asset's so-called "fundamental" value is just the "tree" of
possible long-term cash flows it is likely to throw off, as discounted by (a)
the probabilities assigned to each limb of the tree, (b) money inflation, and
(c) associated opportunity costs, including consumption deferral and
61
cognate determinants of the so-called "time-value of money.,
Considered assessments of fundamental value thus parsed can, of course,
change over time because the component discount factors can change,
particularly as knowledge accumulates through time. But change in this
case tends to be incremental and gradual, as the just-employed terms
"considered" and "accumulate" tend to suggest, even if sometimes it also

61. There are, of course, often multiple varyingly likely inflation scenarios--"limbs"-as well,
and there are opportunity costs additional to that of foregone consumption. Valuation can grow very
complicated. See generally TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE

VALUE OF COMPANIES (4th ed. 2005); STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE (2005). We can
prescind from all that for present purposes. The point is that "fundamental" valuation can be done, that
it is not mere whistling in the dark, and that market valuations can diverge significantly from such
"fundamentals" for extended temporal intervals even when they remain anchored in them over the
long run.
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can be sudden and radical.62 Market valuation, by contrast, is generally
susceptible to much greater volatility, even if nonetheless ultimately
anchored in and constrained by "fundamental" valuation.6 3 For there are
many more determinants of market participants' purchasing and selling
decisions than news bearing upon "fundamental" value alone. 64 In
particular, there is what those participants see other participants doingbehavior that might, but certainly need not always, be prompted by
"fundamental" considerations.
Now, as noted above, one need not deny individual rationality to hold
consumer inflation or asset price bubbles possible. Just so, one need not
deny markets' informational efficiency-not even "strong-form"
efficiency, let alone the "weak" or "semi-strong" forms that are
empirically better supported-to distinguish between more volatile
"market" and less volatile "fundamental" asset value. 65 One need only
recognize that asset prices during some periods change more rapidly and
radically than do valuations conducted pursuant to traditional accounting
methods, without the latter methods being thereby discredited.66
One can see how this might be upon pausing to ask whether some
people might sometimes act as what Fischer Black canonically dubbed
"noise traders. 67 Those are people who trade, not on the basis of one or
another bit of information they have received that would seem to bear
directly upon likely firm payouts in future, but instead on the basis either
of what they see other traders doing, or on the basis of what they anticipate
future traders will do. "Beautiful Baby" betting of the Keynesian sort
mentioned above is noise trading in the requisite sense. And it, like noise
trading more generally, is among those phenomena that underwrite socalled "herd behavior" on asset markets.
"Beautiful Baby" betting can also aggregate behavior that is
individually rational into behavior that proves, in the end, to be

62. Examples would include a sudden discovery that asbestos causes fatal illness, for example; or
that some new power source is viable. In such cases, the "fundamental" values of certain .firms would
change very quickly.
63. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 60.
64. Rumors to the effect that an unusually effective CEO has taken ill, for example, or reports
that Warren Buffett is dumping his shares of some firm, would be cases in point. If such reports turn
out to be false, or to have been misinterpreted, changes in share price might be canceled out as quickly
as they occurred.
65. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J.FIN. 1575 (1991); Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
66. To recur to the examples supra note 64: the sudden share price changes mentioned there
would not impugn the propriety of share valuation methods that attended to "fundamentals" rather than
immediate market-valuation.
67. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J.FIN. 529, 529-30 (1986).
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collectively pathological. It affords the stuff, that is to say, of a species of
coordination problem whose worst sorts of consequences we are
experiencing now. It is time now we turned to the "game" structure of this
form of collective action problem.
2. Ponzi Processes: There Need Be No Ponzi
Trading of the "Beautiful Baby" variety just sketched, particularly
when easily levered by inexpensive borrowing, generally constitutes or
compounds the effects of the underlying mechanism of the prototypical
speculative asset bubble-a mechanism that stems from the just-discussed
nature of speculative assets and purchases themselves. The reason is that
such trading can quickly come to bear the familiar structure of "chain
letter," "pyramid," or "Ponzi"-style schemes-schemes that capitalize on
some peoples' propensities to make purchasing decisions less on the basis
of traded assets themselves than on the basis of what they see or anticipate
other people doing.68 Ponzi or pyramid dynamics seem to be operative in
all of the most devastating speculative asset price bubbles and bursts on
record.69
It is crucial at the outset to be clear on the fact that there need be no
Ponzi or scheme in these cases. Though the "fire," to grow large, needs the
fuel of cheap credit or leverage, hence the complicity of influential actors,
the initial combustion is, in a certain sense, typically "spontaneous." It
need not be deliberately set, nor need the spark that ignites it be in any
sense ill-prompted or ill-motivated. The ongoing Ponzi process, moreover,
once underway, need involve no irrationality on the part of individual
participants in the markets; indeed, quite the contrary. The problem is the
fuel. The relevant form of irrationality or negligence, if any there be, is
that of the overseer charged with controlling the fuel, when s/he is deluded
or willfully blind to the fact that the fire is started and soon might grow out
of control.
Where institutional structures operate in a manner that aggregates
instances of individual rationality into collective irrationality-or what is
the same thing, where our problem is a straightforward collective action
problem-the only irrational agents "we" need collectively worry about

68. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9, at 64-67 (discussing "naturally
occurring Ponzi processes").
69. A still-unsurpassed narratival catalogue of such cases through financial history is
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1. Now in its fifth edition with a co-author, the work finds
occasional citation below.
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are those charged with acting on behalf of the collectivity itself. Collective
irrationality demands a rationally acting collective actor-a good
regulator.
Do these claims not fly in the face of recent orthodoxy? How can one
say such things? Here is how: with a nice, clean-cut game from the '50s.
Imagine, then, a game of automotive "chicken" like that played in Rebel
Without a Cause,70 but with a few variations to pick up some salient
features of present-day asset markets. James Dean and the punk who has
provoked him are still poised to drag race in the direction of a cliff's
edge. 71 He who bails from his Chevy first, moreover, will still lose the
game.72 But in contrast to the race as it occurred in the film, these three
amendments are made to the rules of the game: First, the drivers, who can
now number more than just two, are forward-wise blindfolded before they
can see how far the cars are from the cliff. They can see only each other,
peripherally; they do not know how far they are from the cliff's edge.73
Second, the drivers are paid prize money by the foot, so to speak, so
long as they do not drive over the cliff. The more ground you cover, in
other words, short of driving over, the more money you clear.74 You are
also, moreover, permitted to make side bets with others as to your and
your opponents' future performances, assuming that you can find
counterparties. These bets might be for portions of your prize money, but
also might be for assets you hold prior to playing the game; some of them
might even hedge against loss prospects you face, much as insurance
policies do.7 5 If you drive over the cliff, then, you might lose some or all
of your winnings and even more, or you might lose very little, if anything.
And none of this is certain, for reasons I provide next.
Finally, third, no driver will be killed or maimed if he goes off the cliff.
There's a net-perhaps a number of differently placed nets--down below.
The driver might also be monetarily "bailed out" up to some amount in the
end, in the sense that he might be permitted to keep some, perhaps even a
lot, of his total money winnings, game winnings, and side-bet winningsshould he go over the cliff. (We might think of differently placed nets as

70.

REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1955).

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. They do not know when the bubble will burst, in other words--only that, at some point, it
will. They know that anyone who keeps driving without ever stopping will go over the cliff. But all
they can see for the moment is each other.
74. The longer you ride the bubble up, the more money you will make, provided you get out
before the thing bursts.
75. The intended analogy here is to derivative contracts.
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different loss amounts.) But he does not know how much, if indeed any,
he might get to keep.76 Nor does he know how far he will fall before
reaching the net. There might be some butterflies on the way down.77
Now, this is the thing to ask about this strange game: Is there any
canon of rationality pursuant to which those who go over the cliff can
definitively be judged to have been less rational than those who do not?
Are losers, or any participants, clearly less rational than others? I think the
answer is no. For there seem to be no grounds for decision making here
other than those afforded by risk-taste. And risk-taste is no different from
wine-taste or beer-taste where standard-form rationality is concerned.78
Moreover, consider now those who do not quite reach the cliff's side,
but nevertheless come closer to that edge than do others: if the aim is to
win more, will not they seem in hindsight to have been in a certain sense
"more rational," sensible, or savvy than others, notwithstanding their
79
having drawn closer to the uncertain "calamity" that is the drive-over?
We certainly seem often to make judgments of that sort, with the benefit
of hindsight at any rate.
Further questions now press themselves on us: Won't anyone who
refuses to play the game at all, if she or he has the opportunity, seem a bit
quirky, eccentric, or backward-like one who bans laptops in
classrooms-not to take part in it, at least for a few feet of driving?80 And
won't that especially seem so when "everyone else" seems to be playing or
queuing up to play? Won't that be so particularly if, plausibly enough, we
add a fourth rule to the game, to the effect that, at least short of driving
over the cliff, each driver's prize money per driven foot will be an
increasing function of the number of wannabe players queued up in the
bullpen waiting to drive next?8 1 Indeed, add a fifth rule, to the effect that

76. For he lacks knowledge not only as to what the game administrators will be willing to do,
bailout-wise, but also as to how much they might be able to confiscate from other players and
nonplayers to make some cliff-diving players whole or more whole.
77. It is a commonplace among central bankers that bailouts must be attended by uncertainty, lest
actors succumb to moral hazard and, in the certainty that they will be rescued, act in effect to bring on
the catastrophe from whence they need to be bailed out. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cosimano, The Banking
Industry under Uncertain Monetary Policy, 12 J. BANKING & FIN. 117, 123-24 (1998); Thomas F.
Cosimano & John B. Van Huyck, Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control, 31
ECON. INQUIRY 370 (1993).

78. This is, of course, the standard "liberal," "instrumental," or "formal" conception of
rationality. See MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 26 (1978) (1926).
79. "In a certain sense" because only in hindsight. For, in hindsight, there is sufficient
information to assume, erroneously, that there was more than risk-taste at play in the game.

80. Same caveat as per the previous footnote applies.
81.

Here is where the Ponzi element kicks in. The more coming in at the back end, the more

money won by the front-enders-and those who enter the queue do so in express anticipation that

2010]

A FIXER-UPPER FOR FINANCE

1235

the people who win least on the way-those who drive slowly, in other
words-are driven off the board and lose everything, or are in their
timidity violating fiduciary duties that they owe to clients who bet on
them, and it will seem positively "crazy" not to take part and run hard. 2
The game I have described here in essence is just that of any asset
market during times of so-called "speculative mania., 83 Once an asset
price bubble is underway in today's informational environment, there
seems little, if any, way of knowing just when it will burst or begin to
deflate. (I will hedge that remark in a moment.) Prospective and actual
participants accordingly face what F. Knight would have called radical
"uncertainty," as distinguished from mere "risk., 84 That is to say, they not
only do not know what particular outcomes will actually "come out," but
also lack any information concerning probability distributions among
apparently possible outcomes.85 They are in a complete informational
vacuum. In consequence, even informationally efficient markets-that is,
those that impound price-relevant information very quickly through the
mechanism of trading behavior by market participants-will afford no
helpful clues.
Under these epistemic circumstances, it is not clearly irrational to play
the game, at least for an indefinite while-particularly when there seems a
good chance that casualties will be made partly or fully whole by a lender,
or unconditional provider, "of last resort., 86 Indeed it seems almost
irrational or eccentric not to play if one can, particularly while so many

many more will be coming in behind them. Many thanks to Scott Sakiyama for encouraging me to
draw out this feature of the Ponzi structure.
82. John Geanakoplos, per his role with the Ellington Group Hedge Fund, speaks compellingly
of how quickly the fund lost its clients when it chose to refrain from participating in the real estate
bubble of the early 2000s. Email from John Geanakoplos, Professor of Econ., Yale Univ., to Robert
Hockett, Professor of Law, Comell Univ., February 16, 2009 (on file with author).
83. There are other nice names in the literature, some of venerable vintage. Adam Smith and
contemporaries referred to "over-trading." See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 2833. What invariably followed, these folks called "revulsion" and "discredit." Id. It was as if they were
describing the aftermath of a bender. Germans spoke of a Torschlusspanik-a"door shut panic." Id. at
28.
84.

FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). The same form of uncertainty

figures prominently not only in KEYNES, supra note 49, but also in his much earlier Treatise on
Probability,largely written during the teens of the twentieth century, though not published until 1923.
See, e.g., ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1883-1946: ECONOMIST, PHILOSOPHER,
STATESMAN (2003).

85. See sources cited supra note 84. This form of uncertainty lies at the heart of Keynes's theory
of liquidity preference, and thus the rate of interest-a fact of which "neoclassical synthesizers" of
Keynes from Hicks onward, in contrast to the sage James Tobin, lost sight.
86. Hence, of course, the familiar moral hazard concern invariably raised in connection with
bailouts and the lender of last resort function. For more on the "lender of last resort" function, see, e.g.,
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 225-74.
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others are playing and winning and driving out of business those few who
will not go along for the ride. It even seems rational to draw quite as close
to the cliff as one can, particularly when one might plausibly assume that
there will be some sign that she is nearing the cliff-a sudden loss of
altitude, say, at the front end of that Chevy whose rear passenger window
is flush with her driver's seat window. A highly respected Fed Chairman,
after all-a Chairman, moreover, widely celebrated as a stalwart of market
efficiency-has in effect told her as much.87
Note, moreover, that if you have got into the game fairly early, so that
there are many queued up behind you and your prospective winnings
accordingly have come to look very impressive, you will be especially
reasonably tempted to stay on for a while. And you will be all the more
seemingly reasonably tempted if the game becomes something of a cult
hit. For your temptation will be vindicated by the proverbial "wisdom of
crowds"-in this case, the crowds both of wannabe players queued up
behind you, and of chattering talk-show guests, magazine articles, and
mass-market paperback books. And if, like most people, you are relatively
confident in your own abilities relative to those of others, you will simply
be all the more tempted to play.88
Now, as noted a moment ago, what I have laid out here in stylized
fashion is just the "game" structure of most so-called "speculative
manias." All I have left out is what gets the game going, a few flourishes
inapplicable to James Dean, and the matter of what those who act on
behalf of the collectivity-the regulators-ought to do about the collective
pathology into which these decentralized individually rational behaviors
can aggregate. Let's fill out the picture a bit.
Typically what happens in real-life asset price bubbles is this: First
comes the familiar "exogenous shock., 89 Some new discovery, invention,
technology, or other change points toward new profit-making

87. Chairman Greenspan notoriously said in 2004 that home buyers would be irrationally
foregoing sizeable capital gains were they to forego ballooning adjustable rate mortgages. See
Greenspan Says Personal Debt Is Mitigated by Housing Value, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C 11,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/business/24fed.html?ex=1231131600&en=8882
db4e0fc674da&ei=5070. For more on this, see infra Part II.A.3.
88. This well-known tendency is documented in a large body of psychological studies. It is not
clearly irrational. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of
Extreme Confidence, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 552 (1977).
For a popularly accessible survey, see HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000).

89. See, e.g., HYMAN P. MINSKY, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, in CAN "IT" HAPPEN
AGAIN? ESSAYS IN INSTABILITY AND FINANCE (1982); see also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note

1,at 25-30.
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opportunities in the future. It might be the steam engine, the railroads, the
automobile, the telegraph, the mainframe, or desktop or laptop computer.
It might even be some new financial technology, we will see. Or a
demographic change tending to spark more demand for some good or
service.
Second, credit and equity investment begin reasonably flowing toward
those who produce, sell, or otherwise appear poised to profit by the new
opportunities in question. 90 The "fundamentals" of such investments, after
all, look very promising. At least that is so for a while. And so they attract
capital.
Third, demand for credit by those wishing to invest in the new
industries in question begins to grow, and lenders grow more and more
willing to oblige in exchange for a piece of the action. 9 They do so first
on the security of various unrelated forms of collateral, then on the
underlying assets themselves, then in time upon less, little, or no security
as Ponziat all. In short, "leverage" rates grow first as optimism, and then
' 92
style self-fulfilling optimism, begin spreading or "cascading. "
Once such increasingly generalized optimism and then self-fulfilling
optimism kicks in, the collateralized assets that prompt spiked investment
in the first place begin growing in value in virtue of that optimism itself,
meaning that they can underwrite more borrowing. 93 Signs of a "positive
feedback loop" begin to emerge: Demand drives levered purchases, which
drive up speculative asset prices, which drive further demand-just as the
characterization of "pure" speculation in the previous section would lead
us to expect.94
Finally, the process edges toward pathological territory when
borrowing flips over entirely from borrowing meant to capitalize on the
"fundamental value" thrown off by the new asset or industry itself, to
borrowing meant to capitalize upon other people's desires thus to
capitalize-"Beautiful Baby" borrowing. 95 At that point, there are not
simply signs of a positive feedback loop; the continuing price rise now is
just that loop. A Ponzi process has fully kicked in; we are flying on
afterburners.

90. See sources cited supra note 89.
91.

Id.

92. This is the picture portrayed by some "new institutionalist" theorists of finance. See, e.g.,
STIGLITZ & GREENWALD, supra note 20; see also sources cited supra notes 20, 89.

93. See sources cited supra note 89.
94. Id.
95. Id
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Now, when does the Ponzi portion of the process emerge? The Ponzi
process kicks in once a "critical mass" of levered purchasers of the asset in
question coalesces.96 The mass is "critical" in the sense that levered
purchasers no longer borrow cheaply simply in order to purchase the asset
in question on favorable terms with a view to consumption or interest or
dividend streams: they borrow now also-and increasingly-with a view
specifically to purchase for resale, in the manner described in connection
with "speculative assets" in the previous section. Now, that is to say,
levered purchasers are effectively arbitraging; they are legging the spread
between borrowing rates and capital appreciation rates-in effect driving
97
the "equity premium" that has so "puzzled" some financial theorists.
Once that occurs, the bubble has formed and begins to inflate very
quickly. 98 Credit-enabled "pure speculation" of the sort described in the
previous section is now underway.
Now, crucially, as the process veers into this self-reinforcing "positive
feedback" phase, no authority-in particular, no central bank-charged
with controlling the money supply and/or lending or leverage rates acts on
behalf of the collectivity to tighten up credit or levering. Nobody acts, that
is to say, to spare us the collective pathology toward which our
decentralized rational actions tend to aggregate. More and more peopleeven undergraduates or "Mom and Pop" types-begin to make use of
cheap credit to purchase and "flip" assets, even houses, of all things.
Popular culture begins to reflect these developments too. "Marketwatching" networks like CNBC, and programs like "Market Place" and
"The Motley Fool," begin to proliferate on radio and television. "How to"
books spread over the shelves in the pop-finance sections of bookstores.
The bubble, under a less-disparaging name, becomes an object of popular
attention, even rabid or morbid fascination. Media pundits increasingly
talk about it-even on nonfinance programs. "Experts" on generalist talk
shows extol and marvel over it. People find themselves increasingly told
that they would be foolish not to take part in the party-they will be
"leaving money on the table."

96. Id.
97. The "equity premium puzzle" that has so vexed some financial theorists is actually not all
that puzzling once we notice the prevalence of asset price bubbles. The rate of asset price inflation
simply outruns that of borrowing costs for as long as the bubble inflates. For more on these matters,
see, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium
Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73 (1995); Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle,
34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 42 (1996); Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A
Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 145 (1985).

98. See sources cited supra note 89.
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As the asset bubble continues to grow, some begin finally-typically
after a few years-to wonder how long it can last. Opinion eventually
begins to divide. Some commence talking in "new era" terms, pointing to
some underlying attribute of the asset or market in question that putatively
distinguishes it from those associated with previous, purportedly lesssustainable bubbles. In the case of the tech stock bubble of the late 1990s,
for example, the novel development was that of new information,
communications, and computing technologies, which some said rendered
accelerating growth rates in business productivity inevitable for many
years to come. 99 Even Fed Chairman Greenspan, of all people, joined this
particular "new paradigm" bandwagon-surprisingly soon after his
widely-quoted, express concern over "irrational exuberance."' 00
In other cases, like those more recently of petroleum or real estate, the
special feature called to attention is the finitude of supply of the asset in
question, conjoined with the indefinite extensibility of the population that
will demand it-Ricardian "marginal land rents"''
and Malthusian
"geometric population growth" theory 0 2 combined, it would seem. People
say real estate "can only go up," or that petroleum prices are bound to
keep rising. They say it is inevitable, and note that the prices in question
"have never gone down" or have never gone down for more than a few
quarters. Chairman Greenspan seems to have joined the bandwagon, too,
as did the bond-rating agencies.' °3 So did the ubiquitous, hyped book titles
and television programs: The Automatic Millionaire Homeowner, Flip
That House!, and so on-real titles all.
It does not seem to be widely appreciated that earlier bubbles, going
way back, have in all cases featured like forms of "new era" talk to those
that we have recently endured.' n Look back at past manias, and the words
used ring eerily familiar. Probably the least obscure such case from the
not-so-distant past is that of Irving Fisher of Yale, by far the most widely
known and respected American economist of his day, one indeed still
widely esteemed for the originality of his contributions to monetary theory
and the theory of index numbers, among other things. 10 5 Fisher was, alas,

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
TESTS,

See, e.g., infra note 100.
See, e.g., Adam Zagorin, Greenspanand His Friends, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 46,48.
See RICARDO, supranote 59, at 44-61.
See T.R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON POPULATION (E.P. Dutton 1914) (1798).
See, e.g., supra note 88; see also infra Part lI.B.
See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, for many droll examples.
See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS: A STUDY OF THEIR VARIETIES,
AND RELIABILITY (1922); IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY

IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT (1930).
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what turns out to have been less original when he was widely quoted as
saying, in October 1929 no less, that "[s]tock prices have reached what
looks like a permanently high plateau."'0 6
Esteemed professors of economics at Harvard and Princeton fared little
better than Fisher that year. Professor Lawrence, at Princeton, averred in
September that stocks were not overvalued. He then provocatively added,
as if in anticipation of a book title that would ring popular seventy-five
years thence, "[w]here is that group of men with the all-embracing wisdom
which will entitle them to veto the judgment of th[e] intelligent
multitude?"' 0 7 The Harvard Econometric Society did not disagree and
went so far as to say, shortly after the October crash, that "a severe
depression like that of 1920-21 is outside the range of probability. We are
not facing a protracted liquidation."'' 0 8 As Galbraith archly notes, they
continued to say so right up to the point that the market was liquidated. 0 9
Few, then, seem to notice during periods of speculative mania that
those plausible long-run trend-lines of the sort upon which "new era"
stories implicitly trade are perfectly compatible with short-term and even
medium-term fall backs en route-just as we noted in the previous section
that the existence of plausible "fundamental" values is perfectly consistent
with somewhat more volatile, and not necessarily irrational or
informationally inefficient, market valuations. Most think instead like the
folk who have noticed that the summer of 2008 was cooler than summer of
2005, then pronounce global warming a hoax. And they call the few who
express caution-those who see pyramiding or "irrational exuberance""Cassandras" or "Chicken Littles."
Leverage-wise, the bold, in the meanwhile, grow ever more extended.
The borrowing that fuels bubbles has been helpfully taxonomized into
three phases.11 0 During the first phase, borrowers borrow against more- or
less-assured future cash flows. In the second phase, assured future cash
flows do not suffice to cover debt repayment obligations; borrowers must
refinance either by rescheduling prior obligations or undertaking new
ones. Finally, in the third phase, debt obligations can be covered only if
the borrower succeeds in selling the asset she purchased with the
borrowings at a significantly appreciated price.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

The line is often quoted. In this case, I quote from GALBRAITH, supra note 6, at70.
Id. at 70-71. Perhaps an early appeal to "the wisdom of crowds."
Id.
Id.
See sources cited supra note 89; see also IRVING FISHER, THE DEBT DEFLATION THEORY OF

DEPRESSIONS (1933).
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Third-phase debt is accordingly sustainable only for as long as the
market for the asset in question continues to rise, and is forthcoming only
for as long as lenders believe it will continue to do so. Debt in this case,
therefore, rests on a spontaneously emergent Ponzi process of the kind
described above. Once the pool of prospective new entrants to this market
approaches exhaustion, therefore, such that prices can no longer rise, thirdphase debtors quickly prove to be overexposed, their short positions
precarious. Asset markets are set for a crash, credit markets for a crunch.
3. Minsky Moments: What Goes Up Must Come Down the Same
Pathway
The three-phased leverage cycle just rehearsed is often associated with
the writings of Hyman Minsky-often disparaged in his day as precisely
the sort of Cassandra I mentioned that bubble boosters are prone to
mock."' l In effect, the "manic" hump of the credit cycle that he
schematized is just the flip side of those depressed "animal spirits" that
Keynes highlighted as being at work in the slump of the 1930s."'
Minsky's signal contribution was to link those depressed spirits diagnosed
by Keynes symmetrically up with the manic ones that culminate in the
crashes that occasion them.1
A student of Schumpeter's-hence derivatively of Wicksell and indeed
even Fisher-as well as an enthusiastic interpreter of Keynes, Minsky was
particularly attentive to the role of credit cycles and debt structures both in
the run up to, and in the aftermath of, all asset price crashes.' 14 Like
Fisher, he emphasized the homology between debt-driven asset inflations
on the one hand, and what amount to debt-canceling "corrective"
deflations on the other. Only the "directions" change, he maintained;
structure abides. 15 Like Schumpeter, moreover, Minsky took this cycling
to be, in a certain sense, unavoidable in the absence of attentive
regulation-in effect, "hard-wired" into any capitalist economy featuring
money, credit, and financial markets. 1 6 He accordingly emphasized, like

111.

See, e.g., HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975);

HYMAN P. MINSKY,

STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986). The model that he developed is now popularly known
as the "financial instability hypothesis." It is thought to be a competitor to the so-called "efficient
capital markets hypothesis." That is a mistake.
112. See KEYNES, supra note 49, at 161-63.
113. See MINSKY, supra note 89.
114. An early version of this picture is presented in Fisher's "Debt Deflation Thesis." See IRVING
FISHER, BOOMS AND DEPRESSIONS: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES (1932).

115.

See sources cited supra note 89.

116.

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND
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Keynes, the crucial credit-modulatory role that central banks had to play in
advanced financial economies in regulating the rate of credit-"Regulation
as Modulation," I will call it below in Part IV." 7
In effect, then, Minsky viewed the role of the central bank much as did
William McChesney Martin, Jr., Federal Reserve Chairman from the
Truman to the early-Nixon eras. 1 8 Martin is known as the Federal
Chairman who first articulated the Treasury Department's role as that of
"leaning against the wind." "The function of the Federal Reserve," he once
memorably observed, "is to take away the punch bowl just as the party is
getting good." 119 Why? Because, as just suggested, credit-expansionfueled speculative asset bubbles of the sort described above invariably
cease, then reverse into devastating credit, and then productive
contractions. Hereof the storied
"Minsky Moment" of which we read
120
much in the press these days.
A Minsky Moment is simply an inflection point between exuberantly
protracted asset price rises on the one hand, and depressively protracted
asset price falls on the other.12 1 It is reached when22 the credit-fueled Ponzi
Process that is the asset price rise has been spent. 1
When and how does that happen? In essence, like this: As market
efficiency advocates themselves emphasize, arbitrage opportunities
ultimately are exploited. 23 Spreads accordingly close. The reason is
obvious; as more and more parties borrow in order to purchase
appreciating assets, they draw borrowing rates higher. 24 Rentable money,
though supply can grow steadily, is not infinitely extensible. Nor is it itself
a speculative asset. It is, rather, more like those "normal goods" and
services described in the previous section; as demand continues to grow
and supply limits come to be approached, prices rise. The spread between
interest and capital gains narrows.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).

117. See MINSKY, supra note 89.
118. See, e.g., Business: The Martin Era, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, available at http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878186,00.html; Melody Petersen, Willian McChesney Martin, 91,
Dies; Defined Fed's Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/
29/business/william-mcchesney-martin-91 -dies-defined-fed-s-role.html?pagewanted = 1.
119. MARTIN MAYER, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIVES THE MARKET 165 (2001).

120. Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
2007, atAl, availableat http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB 11 8736585456901047.html.
121. See sources cited supranote 89.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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At some point, those who have been in on the spread-closing game for
a while begin to take profits and sell out. 125 As credit limits are closed in
on, more and more erstwhile market participants do the same. At the same
time, upper limits on new prospective market participants begin to be
reached.126 At some point, the value of exits comes to equal, then
flickeringly to exceed, the value of entries. 27 The inflection point has been
reached, and so-called "financial distress" ensues. 128 The "distress" period
can last for a while. People begin to contemplate at least the possibility
that they might not be able to realize sufficient capital gains through asset
sales to cover the debt obligations they have incurred in taking positions in
the market in question.
Often during these periods of flicker, one begins to hear reassuring
words from political leaders, central bankers, and other financial
authorities. 2 9 The central bank might lower interbank lending rates and
ambiguously promise lines of credit to unnamed large institutions should
they get into trouble. Executives and legislatures speak of tax cuts,
government expenditures, and other stimulants. We know the drill. Sounds
like 2007.
At about this point in the process, the disturbing suggestion that the
speculative buildup that has culminated in the plateau might have been the
product of a Ponzi process begins to grow more and more widespread.
Those who once were called "Cassandras" come to look more like they
might have been "prophets."'' 30 Some say, in triumph, "I told you so."
Others say, "what next?"
The same perception that the party may be nearing its end, meanwhile,
often finds itself reinforced by the many scandals that typically emerge
during these critical inflection periods.' 31 For as the boom phase nears its
end prior to plateauing, it is common for some who have grown
overextended to begin to cut comers, then more than comers. At first these
folk talk themselves into believing that they will "pay it all back." But, in
fact, many just dig themselves deeper and deeper, to the point that they

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. A Minsky coinage. See MINSKY, supra note 111, at 118.
see also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supranote 1, at 25-30.
129. Id.;
130. This has been, for example, Professor Shiller's recent lot. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE, supra note 9 (blurb on back cover).
131. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 25-30; MINSKY, supra note 89; see also
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 165-202. A contemporary example would be the Madoff
scandal.
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cannot delude even themselves any longer. It is almost surprising how
consistent this pattern has been over the centuries. Truly, it seems, plus Va
change.
The stories of scandal associated with past booms' inflecting to busts
are, in fact, fully as common as, and often even more notorious than, the
"new era" stories typically associated with the same mentioned above.1 3 2
Indeed, the name "Ponzi" itself comes to us thanks not only to a Boston
stock swindle, but also to a Florida real estate scam brought to light
stock market crash.' 33 Yes, in both cases that
shortly before the 1929
134
Ponzi--Charles Ponzi.
Now as a matter of mechanism, what is crucial at these plateaus is that
all players gradually grow mindful of one consequence of the Ponzi
process's having drawn to its limiting point: Each knows, first, that if
people do begin massively selling their holdings of the asset in question,
she herself will do best to leave first. For as has commonly been said of
these circumstances in prior iterations in multiple jurisdictions, Sauve qui
peut, den Letzen beif3en die Hunde, or "Devil take the hindmost." And yet
each knows also, second, both that should a mass exit begin, one will be
lucky indeed to land front of the queue; and so long as no one does begin
selling, most will be better off.
And so now, of course, the "game" we are playing is not "Chicken" as
before, but something more like traditional "Prisoner's Dilemma." As
before, our problem is not one of rationality or efficiency, but of collective
action. But now we are looking at downsides, not up; we are at the cliff's
edge. And as it happens, just as in most empirical runs of the Prisoner
game,' 35 most players do ultimately "defect." It is only a matter of time.
"Stampeding" and "panic selling" begin.
The picture once panic selling begins is familiar: It is just that of the
"bank run" familiar to all Americans prior to the development of deposit
insurance in the early 1930s. Probably the most memorable image is that
in Frank Capra's film, It's a Wonderful Life. 136 It is also that, alas, of what
we have been watching in real estate markets since late 2006, as well as in

132. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 165-202 for a catalogue of examples. See
also GALBRAITH, supranote 1; ALLEN, supra note 1.
133. See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 4-5.
134. The tale is well told in FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF THE NINETEEN-TWENTIES (1931), a forgotten work that bears rediscovery today.
135. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E.

Roth eds., 1995).
136.

IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=MJN9qwhkkE.
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real estate-linked markets since 2007. Those are markets that used to be
dominated, so far as credit is concerned, by well-regulated, deposit-insured
thrifts and commercial banks. But they are markets that, since the mid1990s, have featured a huge, scarcely regulated industry of so-called
"mortgage banks." To this unglamorous story we now turn.
B. Bubbles Just Happened: Of Easy Credit, New MortgageProducts,
House-Flipping,Foreclosure,and Global Contagion
The model of asset price bubbles just schematized can be seen at work
in most past financial crises. 137 And odds are, it is only a matter of time
before the U.S. experience of the past decade officially joins the parade of
specimens in works of financial history. In this Subpart, I will explain
why. I will first briefly recapitulate the past decade's most salient events,
as selected by the model just sketched, and then proceed to solutions in
Part III. As ever, the past decade's story appears to have begun with
genuinely new, value-adding opportunities, which cheap credit and loose
money then converted to untethered, Ponzi-style excess.
1. The "GreenspanPut": New Techs, New Stocks, New Eras, New
Money
Above, we noted that asset price bubbles typically begin with
exogenous developments that attract new investment. 3 8 In our recent
financial history, the catalytic moments in question appear to have been
first the development of home computing in the 1980s, then the
privatization of two military communications infrastructures-the World
Wide Web and Internet-in the mid-1990s. The latter medium "took off'
in 1995 with the switch to private control, thanks in part39to the spread of
inexpensive computing technology in the decade before. 1
The upshot was that when Netscape, which developed the first
popularly accessible web browser, went public in mid-1995, its stock price
more than doubled the first day. 140 The year 1995 accordingly makes for a
plausible point at which to date the onset both of the 1990s "dot com"

137. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1 (the best survey available).
138. See supra Part II.
139. See, e.g., Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet's Backbone
Network, http://www.govemingwithcode.orgtjoumal-articles/pdf/Backbone.pdf (last visted May 18,
2010).
140. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 32; WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN WITH FREDRICK SHEEHAN,
GREENSPAN'S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 58 (2008).
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bubble, and of the broader stock market boom that accompanied it. These
bubbles, in turn, we shall see to have fed directly into our recent real estate
boom-in effect, simply reversing the order in which stock and real estate
bubbles inflated and burst in the late 1920s.
Commencing with Netscape's IPO, investment in tech stocks rose
steadily, then rapidly, throughout the second half of the 1990s, as did
investment in stocks more generally. 4 1 Initially, and in keeping with our
model, these rises would have seemed warranted even by "fundamental"
value. As more and more firms learned how to employ new computing and
communications technologies, they became more efficient. Productivity
grew at historically high annual rates over the second half of the 1990s, at
over 4%. 142 It was only natural in such circumstances that firms would
attract increased investment capital, and that the firms that seemed most
responsible for the "miracle"-tech firms-would attract capital
disproportionately.
At the same time, there were other reasons to expect stock prices to rise
rapidly. Some of these were arguably still "fundamental" in character,
others less so. For one thing, American firms over the course of the late
1980s and early 1990s increasingly had adopted Japanese management
and production techniques, which independently improved productivity
growth. 143 That was arguably nearly as "fundamental" a change as the
move to new computing and communications technologies. Somewhat less
fundamental-or, at any rate, less permanent-however, was a critical
demographicdevelopment: Baby boomers began entering their forties and
fifties, typically the most productive working years in one's life, during
this period.
The age shift affected more than productivity, however; it also affected
investment preferences and patterns.' 4 As they aged, baby boomers
thought increasingly about retirement savings and sought sensible
investment vehicles for those savings. It is no accident that the mutual
fund boom, along with changes to the tax code meant to encourage
retirement investment, commenced during this same period. 145 Against this
backdrop, it was natural not only that more people would be looking for
securities in which to invest, but also that some people would begin

141. See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140.
142. MORRIS, supranote 15, at 32.
143. See, e.g., JEFFRY LIKER, REMADE IN AMERICA: TRANSPLANTING AND TRANSFORMING
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1999).

144. See infra note 145.
145.

boom.

See MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW (2008), on this
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betting on the prospect of asset price rises fueled by these demographic
developments themselves. That is to say, it was natural that "Beautiful
Baby" trading of the kind described in our model-trading on expectations
of other people's trading-would ensue.
Not surprisingly, then, securities prices did rapidly accelerate upwards
over the course of the second half of the 1990s. 1 46 The Dow Jones, S&P
500, and NASDAQ Composite Indices all rose steadily through 1995,
more rapidly through most of 1996 and 1997, and then precipitously in the
last years of the 1990s. Here are the trend lines:

146. See infra note 148.
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FIGURE 1: Dow JONES, S & P 500, NASDAQ COMPOSITE TREND
LINES, 1901-2009
Dow Jones Industrial Average: Annual Returns
Year
Percent
Year
Percent
Year
Percent
Year
Percent
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16.3
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-0.4
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1903
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1911
0.4
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-8.1
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-9.2
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7.6
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2.2
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19.6
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-10.3
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-2.1
1983
20.3
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-30.7
1949
13.1
1984
-3.7
1915
81.7
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17.4
1985
27.7
1916
-4.2
1951
14.4
1986
22.6
1917
-21.7
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8.4
1987
2.3
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10.5
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-3.8
1988
11.8
1919
30.5
1954
44.0
1989
27.0
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-32.9
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1921
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21.7
1957
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1923
-3.3
1958
34.0
1993
13.7
1924
26.2
1959
16.4
1994
2.1
1925
30.0
1960
-9.3
1995
33.5
1926
0.3
1961
18.7
1996
26.0
1927
28.8
1962
-10.8
1997
22.6
1928
48.2
1963
17.0
1998
16.1
1929
-17.2
1964
14.6
1999
25.2
1930
-33.8
1965
10.9
2000
-6.2
1931
-52.7
1966
-18.9
2001
-7.1
1932
-23.1
1967
15.2
2002
-16.8
1933
66.8
1968
4.3
2003
25.3
1934
4.1
1969
-15.2
2004
3.1
1935
38.6
1970
4.8
2005
-0.6 1
The annual gain or loss in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1901 to present.
Dividends are not included.
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S&P 500 Index: Annual Returns 1951-2009
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These lines ought to give pause when considered against the backdrop
of the model of asset price bubbles and bursts sketched in Part II.A. By the
lights of that model, it is natural to anticipate growth in borrowing rates, as
stock price rises draw the attention of "Beautiful Baby," then Ponzi-style
investors. And so, indeed, things appear to have transpired, as measured
by leverage ratios among individuals and financial institutions:
FIGURE

2: LEVERAGE RATE TREND LINES, 1995-2000

The Leverage Cycle
Prkes of things like houses and bonds tend to rise when banks make Iteasy to buy them with borrowed
money and fall when banks make it harder-a phenomenon Yale economist John Geanakoplos calls the
leverage cycle. These charts show the relationship between leverage--the amount of money tnvestors
borrow to buy assets-and prices Inthe US. markets for houses and mortgaw bonds.
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Now, in light of these trend lines, one might have expected the Fed-at
any rate, William McChesney Martin's "lean against the wind" Fed-to
step in with a view to modulating market behavior. At least that would be
so were the Fed to view itself as a collective actor, charged with
addressing the collective action problem that we saw asset price bubbles
effectively to be in Part II.A. It could have played that role by imposing
higher capital requirements upon, or by raising the federal fund rate
charged to, depository institutions. It could also have done so by
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tightening the money supply. One might also have expected that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before 1999, and perhaps the
Fed after 1999, would tighten up leverage limits on investment banks. In
fact, however, this was a period that saw both continued financial
deregulation and a pronounced tendency by the Fed to keep interest rates
supply growing: the story of the much-storied
low and the money
147
"Greenspan Put.'

In August 1995, the month of the Netscape IPO mentioned a moment
ago, the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped the benchmark
federal funds rate from 6.00% to 5.75%. 148 The rate continued to drop
thereafter, notwithstanding continued price rises on the securities markets,
for the next year and a half. 149 The March 1997 FOMC meeting brought a
followed by three
modest rise in the rate to 5.5%, but this was quickly
150
successive cuts over the following fifteen months.
By the end of 1997, meanwhile, the S&P 500 was up 31% for the year,
and over 100% relative to where it had been when the rate-cutting began
in mid-1995.' 5 ' By mid-1998, the same index had gained another 21%, by
which point the Fed had eased up the rate again to 5.5%.152 With the
collapse of the Russian ruble and the near-failing of the Long Term
Capital Management Hedge Fund in the early autumn of that year,
however, the Fed acted preemptively to maintain market confidence by
cutting the rate once again to 5.25%. 153 Though the markets had quickly
surprised everyone with an
rebounded by October, the FOMC
154
extraordinary follow-up cut to 5%.
Thus was born the popular notion of the "Greenspan Put.' ' 5 5 This was
the name given to the growing determination by market investors, over the
course of the late 1990s, that the Fed would do nearly anything to prevent
a serious market decline. 5 6 This meant in effect that those investors could
take on as much risk as they pleased in betting on continued market price
rises. This determination proved for a long while to be correct, with
predictable consequences: Although by mid-October the markets were up

147. See, e.g., Greenspan Put, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenspan
put.asp (last visited May 18, 2010).
148. See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 33.
149. Id.
150. Id. at45.
151. Id. at46.
152. Id. at 50.
153. Id. at51.
154. Id. at 55.
155. See supra note 147.
156. Id.
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by over 3% for the year, and two months later were up 5% more, the
FOMC nonetheless cut rates again, to 4.75%, in November 1998.157
Now began the switch, in effect, to "afterburners," as described per the
model of Part II.A. Tech stocks, in particular, began to rise precipitously,
largely on borrowed money, at the end of the 1990s.15 8 A few well-known
examples: Theglobe.com's IPO, in mid-November, saw the price of its
stock rise by over 600% in one day. 159 The day after Thanksgiving that
year, all fifteen of the NASDAQ's top-gaining stocks rose more than
45%.160

The new year saw the trend accelerating. The average share price gains
for tech firms going public in the first quarter of 1999 were as follows: In
January, 271%; in February, 145%; in March, 146%.161 By mid-year, the
NASDAQ had more than doubled relative to the previous mid-October
measure, when the FOMC had begun its run of rate-cutting.1 62 Finally, the
Fed began raising rates incrementally upward again, to 5.25% in August,
then 5.5% in November 1999.163
By this point, however, incremental Fed funds rate rises were
apparently being ignored. 164 This is not very surprising. For one thing,
investors had by now come to anticipate that the Fed would simply lower
rates again at the first sign of market dipping.' 65 That was the "put." For
another thing, by this point, stock prices were rising so rapidly that a small
hike in interest rates would have appeared negligible; tech IPO stocks
were routinely rising by hundreds of percentage points on their very first
days. 166 Against that sort of rise, what's another quarter percent interest
rate rise? After all, breaking the back of the 1970s consumer price
inflation had required Paul Volcker's Fed to raise rates to 18%.167
At the same time, moreover, in anticipation of "Y2K" worries, the Fed
had been pumping newly printed money into the economy from September
through November of 1999.168 The money supply grew by $147 billion

157.

FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supranote 140, at 59.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 68-70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 64-65.
Id.
Id.
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during the period-a 14% annualized growth rate.169 The last two months
of the year saw that rate grow yet higher, to a 44% annualized rate. 70 This,
for its part, fed into a longer-running Fed trend of this period. From early
1996 to late 1999, the money supply grew by $1.6 trillion, about 20% of
GDP.171 This growth would have fueled the stock price bubble as readily
as low borrowing rates. And it, too, began at about the same time as the
Internet privatization mentioned above.
Old benchmarks of "fundamental" value in the case of stocks,
meanwhile, did not appear to warrant the Fed's willingness to ignore stock
price inflation while celebrating low consumer price inflation; price to
earning ratios grew to unheard-of heights during this period. 7 2 Sober
minences grises like Paul Volcker increasingly worried aloud that tech
stock prices, growing as rapidly as they were, were associated with firms
that had yet to show profits.' 73 Similar concerns were raised in this period
by respected financial economists like John Geanakoplos and Robert
Shiller. 174 It took a while, but in time, they began to be heard.
It gradually came to be clear by the early months of 2000 that the past
several years had been witnessing a classic credit- and loose-money-fueled
stock price bubble. The NASDAQ had risen over 900% relative to where
it had been five years earlier.' 75 Nevertheless, by early February, the
FOMC still had not raised rates beyond 5.75%-where they had been at
the time of the Netscape IPO referenced above. 176 That same week, the
NASDAQ rose 9%-its largest weekly gain in twenty-five years. 177 It
continued to rise until March 10th, the day of its peak. That day, at 5048, it
had risen 24% of its level on the first day of the year. But over the
following two months, it lost 47% of its value. 178 The "Minsky Moment"
had been reached in the tech stock markets.
Stocks more generally, not just tech stocks, began suffering, too. In the
first days of 2001, the S&P 500 dropped 10%. 179 The FOMC responded by

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 76.
Id.

173. See, e.g., Disagreeing with Jeremy Siegel, Dec. 7, 2006, http://runningofthebuls.typepad.
com/toros runningof the bull/2006/12/disagreeingwit.html.
174. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9; Mark Whitehouse, Crisis
Compels Economists to Reach for New Paradigm,WALL ST. J., at A18, availableat http://online.wsj.

com/article/SB125720159912223873.html.
175.

FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supranote 140, at 84.

176. Id. at 85.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 100.
179. Id. at Il1.
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cutting the lending rate again, to 6%, after a sequence of incremental hikes
that had been imposed in the final months of the bubble that peaked in
2000.180 The stock markets wavered thereafter for the first half of the
year.18 1 It seemed that their bubble potential had been spent. That raised a
question: What else remained to maintain growth in the broader economy?
The answer was real estate.
2. Flip That House: When Houses No Longer Are Homes
As the equity bubble inflated over the course of the late 1990s,
spillover from the "wealth effects" experienced by equity holders
gradually grew discernible in the real estate markets. During the first half
of the decade, growth in mortgage debt outstanding grew at an average
annual rate of 3.7%.182 That rate grew to 6.2%, however, in 1996 and
1997, then to 9.5% by 1998.183 By late 2000, total mortgage debt
in the
184
United States was 50% higher than it had been five years before.
Wall Street took notice of these developments just as it did that of
growing interest in tech and other stocks. As long-term interest rates
descended and the money supply grew during the latter half of the 1990s,
all while stock prices shot upward and home prices edged in the same
direction, financial firms began developing and marketing new debt
products.185 In a sense, this was again quite predictable because the prices
of homes-since the 1930s, by far the most highly levered purchases most
Americans make-are highly responsive to borrowing costs. 186
An early new debt product developed in these years was the "refi," a
means of converting home equity growth into cash. 187 With lower interest
rates, homeowners could borrow higher loan amounts on the same
monthly payment arrangements, pay off their previous home loans, and
pocket the difference. Refinancing transactions, valued at $14 billion in
1995, leapt to nearly a quarter-trillion over the ensuing decade.'8 8 As
demand for refis grew, so did demand for more rapid means of processing

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 129.
Id.

184.

Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
See supra note 7 on this point.
See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 68.
Id.
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loan applications. 89 Credit scoring came increasingly
to be automated, and
190
decreasingly to be subject to careful verification.
The tasks of credit scoring, and then credit origination, came
increasingly to be farmed out as well. A new industry of federally
unregulated "mortgage banks," mortgage brokers, and other mortgage
originators began growing rapidly in the second half of the 1990s.' 9' We
know some of the names now: Countrywide, Indy Mac, etc. But in the
early days, these firms grew in the shadows-in the vacuum, really-left
by the hosts of failed thrift institutions that went under during the S&L
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, itself the product of deregulation.
It is only now that we are coming to appreciate the full significance of this
shift; the shift from mortgage-finance originally handled primarily by
well-regulated, community-oriented depository institutions that retained
the mortgages they originated, to a new industry of unregulated,
"countrywide" institutions out to sell what they originated to secondary
holders.
With increasing numbers of unregulated mortgage originators came an
increasing number of yet newer financial products, developed with the aim
92
of bringing yet more people into the levered home-buying markets.,
Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which offered low front-end "teaser"
rates that later "ballooned," were developed to attract less-wealthy buyers
into the home markets. 193 As home prices accelerated over the second half
of the 1990s and then especially in the early 2000s, these debt structures
came to look less imprudent than they might have looked in the past. 194 It
became increasingly plausible to believe that one might "refi" one's
mortgage before higher payment rates kicked in. Indeed, as noted earlier,
Fed Chairman Greenspan himself was saying as much by the early
2000s.' 95
As home prices continued to rise through the late 1990s and early
2000s, mortgage originators naturally looked for new prospects to whom
to lend. If that were not motive enough, the investment banks and other
financial intermediaries, who were discovering the virtues of MBSsessentially, rights to portions of payment streams generated by
mortgages-gradually added to pressures to find new borrowers. The so-

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
See id
1d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supranote 34.
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called "securitization" of mortgages did not, contrary to popular belief,
begin during this period; that began in the late 1930s, as part of the tale
told in the next Part. 196 But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, MBSs
became a favored investment vehicle.197 For one thing, the United States
had not seen large numbers of mortgage defaults since the 1930s-largely
thanks to the programs discussed below in Part 111.198 For another thing,
once home prices began to rise quickly, profits on lending grew, too; the
safe form of investment that was the MBS became likewise a lucrative
one.
Now, in the case of the U.S. housing markets, the classic positive
feedback loop described in the model presented in Part II.A appears to
have kicked in by the early 2000s. Increasingly, people began borrowing
to buy homes less with a view to inhabiting them than with a view to
"flipping" them-to selling them at a profit as home prices rose. By 2005,
fully 40% of all U.S. home purchases had come to be investment
purchases-bought with the intention of resale. 99 That fact showed up in a
particularly telling pair of numbers: Whereas in 1990, there was a total of
$3.8 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt in the United States, in the two
years from 2003 to 2005, mortgage debt grew by nearly that amount.2 °0
The "subprime" loans of which we have heard so much in recent years
appear to have gained popularity as a response to the housing markets
entering this "positive feedback loop" phase. 20 1 By about 2003, the market
for credit to low-risk borrowers had begun to show signs of saturation.
Subprime lending--essentially, loans to people with poor credit histories,
unreliable incomes, or both-grew markedly from 2001 to 2005. Annual
volume was $145 billion in 2001.202 It was over $625 billion in 2005,
accounting for over 20% of home lending in the years 2004-2006.203 That
compared to less than 3% in 1997.2°4 Over a third of the subprime loans
extended in 2004-2006, moreover, were for 100% or more of home
value-in effect, an infinite leverage rate.20 5 The worst of these loans came
to be known as "Ninjas," short for "no income, no job, no assets. ,,206

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.
206.

See infra Part 1ll.
See MORRIS, supranote 15, at 70.
Id.; see also infra Part f11.
See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 158.
Id.
MORRIS, supra note 15, at 70.
See id.; SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9, at 57.
MORRIS, supranote 15, at 70.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
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Ordinarily, of course, lending on such terms would not have been
thought prudent-nor would such borrowing. But again, when prices are
growing at double-digit rates, borrowers and lenders, not unreasonably,
assume that refinancing on the basis of growing collateral values will be
available. So do others. Add in the fact that the two largest mortgage
securitizers-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, more on which in Part IIIhad historic missions to boost home-ownership among lower-income
Americans, and it becomes much less surprising that so much risky
lending and borrowing occurred in the early 2000s.
Against this backdrop, Fed monetary and interest rate policy during the
period looks all the more ominous. As noted in the previous section, the
burst of the tech stock bubble in 2000 led to a difficult period for securities
markets. By mid-2001, the NASDAQ was down 34% for the year, the
S&P down 18%.207 The FOMC continually cut interest rates in response,
to the point that the Fed funds rate was down to 3.5% by September of
2001208 It seems largely by now to have been forgotten that, immediately
following the terrorist attacks of that month, talk was not of the possibility
of a loss of confidence in the securities markets. The concern was, rather,
the possibility of an extension of a "corporate profits recession" already
long since underway.2 °9
The concern proved to be well founded. The NASDAQ declined
another 32% over 2002, while the S&P fell another 24%.210 The Fed
responded to these developments both by lowering the Fed funds rate
dramatically, and by commencing to tout growing real estate prices as a
means of encouraging increased consumer spending. 2 11 By the end of
2001, for example, the funds rate was down to 1.75%.212 By late 2002, it
was at 1.25%.213 Though economic growth had picked up by 2003 with the
surge in Iraq war expenditures, the FOMC dropped the funds rate yet
further, to 1%, in the second quarter of that year.214 There the rate
remained for a full year, until mid-2004. 2 15 All of this was occurring as
home prices, which again are particularly sensitive to interest rates,

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 120.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 120.
See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 115.
Id.
Id.
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charged upward. Here are the numbers in the principal metropolitan areas
of the United States:
FIGURE 3: FOR DATA ON THE PAST 20 YEARS IN 25 MAJOR METRO
AREAS, SEE: HTTP://WWW.FHFA.GOV/WEBFILES/15426/
4QO9HPICBSAPO.TXT

The credit-enabled housing bubble began to draw attention-most of it
favorable-from the popular media and the Fed alike by 2002.
Mainstream magazine articles advised Americans how to "[b]orrow
against [their] house[s] to buy stocks. 216 Fed Chairman Greenspan
testified before Congress on how growing real estate prices were
compensating for the ongoing stock price decline.217 Increasingly, it
seems, policymakers and citizens at large were relying on home price rises
as a generator of consumer spending and economic growth.
The problem, however, was that the growth was being fueled not by
any underlying growth in "fundamental" value, but by the positive
feedback loop of our model. It was Ponzi growth, as is readily verified by
comparing home prices with two plausible proxies for fundamental
value-rental prices and home building prices. Figures 4 and 5 supply the
comparisons.
FIGURE 4: HOME PRICE TRENDS COMPARED TO RENTAL PRICE

TRENDS, 2000-2005
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FIGURE

5: HOME PRICE TRENDS COMPARED TO BUILDING COST
TRENDS, 1890-2005
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In Part IV, I shall argue that information of this sort should be used by
our chief financial regulator, the Fed, in order to catch bubbles as they
begin to inflate. But we're not there yet.
As levered home purchasing drove housing prices higher and higher,
those who were doing the driving by borrowing grew increasingly
exposed-again, as in our model. Were home prices to cease growing,
refinancing would cease to be available, "balloon" rates would accordingly
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kick in, and people would find themselves "under water." Were that to
happen, of course, lenders would be exposed, too. So would those who
owed obligations to the lenders. And this, too, it turns out, was an
important financial development over the course of the late 1990s and
early 2000s.
Financial institutions that invested in MBSs increasingly entered into
derivative risk-trading arrangements with a view to insuring themselves
against losses in portfolio value, in the event of mortgage default. 218 The
huge growth in markets for credit-default swaps of which so much was
heard in 2008, along with those for a host of other derivative risk-sharing
instruments, were products of this era.219
Ordinarily, of course, the spread of risk-bearing is a good thing. It
lessens the exposures of individual actors and makes credit more widely
available and, of course, less expensive. 220 But when the risks being spread
all amount to the risk that a bubble will burst, the spreading in question is
that of a swathe of destruction; it is a growth in the number of victims
once the bubble inevitably bursts. But, of course, the same bubble that
facilitates that spread of exposure is what masks appreciation of how risky
the risks in fact are. For bubble psychology, per the model sketched above,
quickly feeds into "new era" talk, as well as beliefs that the asset price in
question "can only go up."
In the case of real estate, of course, such beliefs seem all the more
reasonable in view of the finite nature of the asset. Land is in limited
supply, while populations keep growing. And home prices have indeed
tended to trend upward, albeit at more reasonable rates than those of the
early 2000s, over time. Perhaps this is why reputable bond rating agencies
gave Triple-A ratings to MBSs, even those backed by large numbers of
subprime mortgages. Their valuation models, after all, assumed unceasing
6-8% growth rates in underlying home prices.22 '
With ratings like those given MBSs by the rating agencies, it is
scarcely surprising that AIG and other insurers were willing to take on the
portfolio risks of so many financial institutions that purchased real and
synthetic mortgage-backed securities in the early 2000s. At all events, the
spread of risk-bearing over the course of the housing price bubble assured
that, once it burst, many would be swept into the ensuring contraction.

218. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 73-79.
219. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 15, at 73-79.
220. A commonplace in explaining the advantages of securitization. See infra Part III on the role
of Fannie Mae.
22 1. See MORRIS, supranote 15, at 78.

2010]

A FIXER-UPPER FOR FINANCE

1263

And, of course, burst it would do. For even undeniable long-term upward
trends, especially if punctuated by periods of bubble behavior, can feature
counterpart periods of decline.
3. Foreclosureand Global Contagion: That Huge Sucking Sound
Housing prices seem to have reached their own "Minsky Moment" late
in the first half of 2006.222 By this point, as many as could be drawn in to
the levered home-purchase markets had apparently been drawn in. Prices
could not continue to rise in the manner that they had done over the
223
previous five to ten years, and they leveled off. Then they began to

decline.2 24 Naturally, in such circumstances, those who had borrowed
pursuant to terms only sustainable so long as prices continued to rise
found themselves pinched. As balloon mortgage rates began to balloon,
low-end borrowers began to default on their mortgages. 225 That, of course,
quickly began lowering the values of mortgage-backed securities.2 26 And
that, in turn, quickly led to calls upon credit default swappers and other de
facto insurers to make counterparties whole.
Over $350 billion worth of subprime and other low-grade home loans
that were closed in 2005 and 2006 "reset" in 2007 and 2008, and their
monthly payments began to balloon.22 7 Foreclosure rates rapidly mounted
in consequence.228 Talk of a "subprime crisis" accordingly began to be
heard in the spring, then increasingly through summer and autumn, of
2007.229 Lenders, then holders of repayment rights, began to feel the pinch.
All of the highest-profile financial institution defaults and bailoutscommencing with Countrywide itself in 2007, on down through Bear
Steams, Fannie and Freddie, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual,
and others-stem directly from the collapse of home prices and
consequent mortgage defaults.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Will the Subprime Crisis Ripple through Economy?, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 13, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.con/id/17584725; Ben. S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20070517a.htm.
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Add to all of this the facts that (1) other nations, too-such as the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain-went through real estate bubbles
of their own during these years; 230 and (2) MBSs and derivative
arrangements tied to mortgage values are held by and implicate the
financial positions of institutions all across the globe, 231 and it is readily
appreciated why the current crisis has from the start been global in nature.
And that is before factoring in the role that contracting credit and
plummeting consumer confidence plays in lowering global demand for
goods and services. Scarce wonder that the IMF reported in early 2009
that the entire world economy was set for its first contraction since the
1940s, which is quite ominous in light of what happened, globally
speaking, last time around.232
The following two figures summarize what has happened and where
we are now. The first reprises the web of financial relations described over
the previous pages. The second summarizes likely debt defaults and writedowns, by category, apt to occur in the coming few years.

230. See MORRIS, supranote 15, at 78.
231. Id.
232. See Int'l Monetary Fund, World Growth Grinds to Virtual Halt, IMF Urges Decisive Global

Policy Response, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2O09/res
012809a.htm.
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FIGURE

6: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS
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"Fl" means Financial Institution-i.e., a Commercial Bank, Investment
Bank, Investment Company, Pension Fund, Insurance Company, or like
institution. "MBS" means mortgage-backed security. "CDS" means credit
default swap or other derivative arrangement. The shaded circle and boxes
indicate that mortgage "banks" are not banks in the ordinary sense-they
take no deposits and are not regulated as depository institutions. The best
known of them these days is probably Countrywide Financial, taken over
by Bank of America in June 2008 after financially faltering. The best
known "securitizers" are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Another notorious
securitizer, this one lacking any "implicit federal guarantee," was the socalled "IndyMac," recently put in receivership.
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FIGURE 7: TABLE OF ESTIMATED DEFAULTS AND WRITE-DOWNS,
CATEGORIZED BY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT-TYPE233
INSTRUMENT

CURRENT

DEFAULT

OUTSTANDING

PERCENTAGE

WRITE-DOWN
PERCENTAGE

RECOVERY NET
RATE

TOTAL

Loss

SUBPRIME & OTHER

HIGH- RISK

$1,500

30%

NA

50%

$225

CDO WRITE-DOWNS

$1,200

NA

40%

NA

$480

PRIME MORTGAGE &
PRIME MBS WRITE-

$5,000

5%

NA

50%

$125

$950

10%

NA

50%

$48

MBS WRITE-DOWNS

$855

NA

15%

NA

$128

NON-MBS REAL
ESTATE WRITEDOWNS

$2,400

10%

NA

50%

$120

MORTGAGE
DEFAULTS
SUBPRIME-BASED

DOWNS
COLLATERALIZED

MBS DEFAULTS
COLLATERALIZED

$1,126

C. What Next?
What, then, are we to do? Well, as mentioned at the outset of this
Article, we have been here before-not just contraction-wise, but
combined stock-and-real-estate-contraction-wise.What is more, we have
reached our present state precisely by having thrown off and bypassed the
methods that we put in place to address the problem last time around-in
the 1930s. The next Part accordingly shows how to address our present
difficulties, precisely by recovering and restoring those systems of
mortgage-finance and financial regulation that worked so well from the
1930s until the 1990s.

233. Source: Morris, supra note 15, at 136-37. Note: This Table excludes anticipated defaults and
write-downs on other forms of debt, including non-mortgage-related corporate bonds and
collateralized loan obligations, as well as credit card and automobile-loan debt. When added to the
above, Morris anticipates over $ 2 trillion in defaults and write-downs economy-wide.
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III. THE FOUNDATIONS AS FIRST LAID: WHERE WE WERE AND
HOW WE GOT THERE

Public memory of the era immediately preceding the New Deal
features two gaps that we would do well now to fill. The first is that, as
mentioned above, the 1929 stock market crash was in fact but a stage in a
longer-term decline.2 34 It was immediately preceded over that course by a
crash in the real estate market. The second is that the system of home
mortgage finance that has made America "a nation of home-owners," as
well as that introduced the financial innovation known as "securitization"
itself, was actually designed and then instituted over the course of the
1930s and '40s, precisely in response to the just-mentioned crisis. 235
Prior to the 1930s, fewer than 40% of American families owned their
own homes, while since that time, upwards of 70% have come to enjoy
that status.236 Where homes are concerned, in other words, the "ownership
society" is a New Deal invention. That society, however, along with the
and
mentioned statistic, is now under threat-as are, in consequence, our
237
1930S.
early
the
in
were
they
as
systems-just
financial
the world's
Early in the twentieth century, as now, most who purchased residential
real estate did so at least partly on credit.238 What was different was that
fewer, for that reason, purchased housing at all. Housing credit markets
were more fragmented, mortgages in consequence much less liquid
investments than they have since become.2 39 Home loans in consequence
years-at
were extended for much briefer terms-generally two to 24three
0
the end of which they would "balloon" to come due in full.

Loan-to-value ratios before the 1930s, in turn, were very low by
modem standards. As little as fifty percent was considered high and was

234. See supra note 1.
235. See, e.g., J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Federal Policy: Encouraging
Homeownership, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 39, 41 (J. Paul
Mitchell ed., 1985); see also D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 225 (1989); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 203-18 (1985). See generally Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by HamiltonianMeans, supra
note 4.
236. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86-120; see
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235.
237. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86-120; see
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235.
238. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by HamiltonianMeans, supra note 4, at 86-120; see
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supranote 235.
239. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86-120; see
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supranote 235.
240. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supranote 4, at 86-120.
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rare. 24 1 Financing on such terms not surprisingly fell short of most wouldbe buyers' capacities. And so second mortgages, junior liens, and rollover
refinancings were the norm. 242 This was not terribly problematic for those
who dared buy, so long as real estate values continued to rise, as they
did-very rapidly-through most of the 1920s. 24 3 Refinancing, then, as
more recently, was not difficult when the value of one's collateral-the
home itself-continued to rise in the real estate boom of the 1920s.2 4
When real estate prices leveled off and then began falling in 1928,
245
however, short-term mortgages no longer could be refinanced in full.
Again, things were much as they are today. Resultant forced sales and
foreclosures, which reached the rate of over 1000 per day once some 50%
of all home mortgages in the country had gone into default, brought prices
steadily lower.24 6 The real estate market fell into the familiar "downward
spiral." The parallel with today could not be more striking.
Indeed, the parallels proliferate. For then also, as today, the crisis that
afflicted the real estate market spread much more widely, ultimately
reaching the stock market itself. The reasons were obvious: For one thing,
upwards of 30% of the American labor force was employed either in the
home-building industry itself, or in industries that were bound to lose
business as home-builders went out of business.24 7 For another thing, of
course, disemployed labor, like fearful and foreclosed mortgagees
themselves, spent less money, feeding yet further contraction.248 The
vortex of contraction, recession, and then depression was on.
The programs instituted to address this widening real estate-rooted
crisis, begun in the last year of the Hoover administration, broadened
through the Roosevelt years and continuing in but minimally altered form
today, cannot fail to impress in their innovativeness and
comprehensiveness. The process began with the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act (FHLBA) of 1932,249 which authorized establishment of a system of
Regional Federal Home Loan Banks roughly parallel to that of the Federal
Reserve's system of Regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Regional

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4; Milton P. Semer et
al., Evolution of FederalLegislative Policy in Housing: HousingCredits, in Mitchell, supra note 235.
247. Hockett, supranote 246; Semer, supra note 246.
248. Hockett, supranote 246; Semer, supra note 246.
249. 12 U.S.C. § 601 etseq. (2006)
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Banks provided standards and supervision to member institutions-the
private mutual savings banks (MSBs) then responsible for most mortgage
lending-and, in return, supplied added lines of credit on the security of
mortgage loans that they held (in effect "monetizing" those mortgages).25 °
The new Congress that took office in 1933 built upon Hoover's welldesigned initiative. It did so first with a Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA)
in 1933,251 which temporarily established a Home Owners Loan
Corporation (HOLC) for refinancing foreclosed loans on favorable terms
to enable erstwhile homeowners to recover their homes. It also laid the
groundwork for a steady spread of more MSBs, by directly affording
national charters even where state authorities might have barred entry.2 52
One year later, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934253 afforded a
system of deposit insurance for the MSBs analogous to that newly
instituted for depositors in commercial banks, further boosting the
availability of lendable deposits. More critically, the NHA instituted a
system of insurance for the MSBs themselves, against defaulting
mortgagors. Section 203 of the Act established a nationwide "mutual
mortgage insurance system," through which a newly created, and in this
case now permanent, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) could insure
first mortgage loans made for the construction, purchase, or refinancing of
one-to-four bedroom family homes. In effect, FHA took over and
discharged indefinitely the functions of the HOLC, which from its
inception had been conceived as ad hoc and temporary.254
FHA still operates today, guaranteeing and, in many cases, originating
or refinancing mortgages that conform to the standards that it imposes (socalled "conforming" mortgages).255 It also affords financial counseling to
borrowers. And it does all of this at no cost to the public fisc-the only
federal agency to do so.
The FHA and its insurance scheme fundamentally altered the regime of
home financing in the United States. It effectively replaced traditional
collateralization requirements with national default-risk pooling, rendering
home loans more affordable. The uniform requirements upon which FHA
conditioned its insurance, for its part, fostered the development of a
standardized home mortgage instrument marketable throughout the

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra note 246.
12 U.S.C. § 1464 etseq. (2006)
Id. § 601 etseq.
48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
12 U.S.C. § 601 etseq.
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by HamiltonianMeans, supra note 4.
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country: the familiar thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage so common to low
end mortgage finance until recently. This, in turn, opened the door to
securitization and hence yet more complete risk pooling. The housing
quality requirements upon which FHA conditioned its insurance also
ensured the financial rationality of federally facilitated home-finance
investments. And FHA's requirements of (a) actuarial soundness, and (b)
risk classifying and separate pooling ensured that the system retained the
traditional efficiencies of a private insurance market.256 That is why it still
operates in the black.
Congress effectively completed its ad hoc discovery of our now
familiar method of financially engineered home-ownership-spreading in
1938, by chartering the first modem "government-sponsored enterprise"
(GSE). The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or Fannie
Mae) was charged with making a national market in FHA-insured
mortgage instruments themselves, i.e., with "securitizing" those
mortgages.257 In effect, Fannie Mae along with later progeny (in particular
Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, to say nothing of the higher education loan
securitizers like Sallie Mae, expressly patterned after the Fannie Mae
model2 58), closed the proverbial circle, separately completing the markets
for housing credit and credit-risk bearing, thereby optimizing the
availability of such credit to home buyers in the manner described earlier.
Fannie Mae proved sufficiently successful, even on market terms, to
privatize in 1968.259 (Sallie Mae did so in late 2004.)260 Freddie, for its
part, was instituted in 1970 specifically in order to compete with the newly
privatized and gargantuan Fannie. 261 Both Fannie and Freddie
subsequently came to offer a multitude of home finance services and
operated effectively, as well as profitably, in spreading home-ownership
until recently.262

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com (last visited May 18, 2010).
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Here is the full picture:
FIGURE

8: HOME-FINANCING STRUCTURE AFTER FEDERAL HOMEFINANCE LEGISLATION OF THE 1930S & 1940S

E
Fw--l Fl

Note that HOLC, whose Board comprised FHLBB Board Members,
was-by terms of its implementing legislation-a temporary measure,
phased out in 1936. FHLBB, FHA, and FSLIC have since been merged
into or brought under the aegis of the Federal Housing Finance Board,
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), respectively; but the home-finance
structure mapped here itself remains intact.
Complementing this whole picture, of course, was an extensive
overhaul to our system of financial regulation put into place during the

1272

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:1213

1930s. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 prohibited commercial banks from
affiliating with securities firms or insurance companies.263 The same Act
introduced interest rate regulation imposed upon depository institutions,
with a view to preventing "destructive competition" among them-which
had been blamed for encouraging overly speculative forms of investment
on the part of those institutions. 264 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1933 brought both a national system of deposit insurance and a new lever
with which a federal regulator-the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation-could impose capital requirements and other "safety and
soundness" regulations upon depository institutions. 265
Meanwhile, the Securities Act of 1933, followed by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors and Investment
Company Acts of 1940, of course brought us our familiar forms of
securities regulation, as well as the Securities and Exchange
Commission.26 6 All of these enactments worked to prevent practices of
bank-levered speculation and other abuses on the securities markets, even
as the home-finance measures worked to stabilize real estate markets.
What, then, went wrong? In essence, the story is just that told in the
previous Part, albeit with two added wrinkles that helped set the stage.
First, interest rate regulation and limits on investments by thrift institutions
were relaxed in the middle 1980s, setting the stage for "destructive
competition" in the thrift industry later that decade.267 The resultant
savings and loan crisis ravaged the industry of home-lending institutions
that grew during the 1930s, thanks to the Hoover and Roosevelt initiatives
related above. 268 That gap quickly began to be filled by non-deposittaking, hence unregulated, "mortgage banks," as described above. We
have seen the role that these played in the recent real estate bubble,
particularly commencing in the mid-1990s, when they began to extend
growing numbers of "subprime," non-FHA-conforming loans.
Second, Fannie and Freddie were caught up in bubble psychology just
like so many others, including the Fed Chairman, as noted before. It was
quite profitable to buy ever more risky, non-FHA-conforming mortgages

263. Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-44, 47 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
264. Id.
265. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
266. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (2006); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006).
267. See, e.g., Rob Jameson, ERisk, Case Study: US Savings & Loan Crisis, Aug. 2002,
http://www.erisk.com/leaming/casestudies/ussavingsloancrisis.asp [hereinafter ERisk Case Study].
268. Id.
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so long as property values kept growing at the rates that they grew in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. And global investors in Fannie and Freddie,
including many a large sovereign wealth fund or treasury, insisted that
these profits be sought.269
At the same time, in view of their original missions as engines of our
American home-ownership society, members of Congress and other
officials during the Clinton and Bush years alike-themselves evidently
caught up in the belief that real estate "could only go up"-in some cases
actively pressured the old GSEs to take on more risky mortgages. 270 Why

not pursue the original salutary mission all the more aggressively, after all,
if even the Fed Chairman was convinced that real estate would just keep
rising in value? Finally, in view of Fannie's governmental lineage,
Fannie's and Freddie's "implicit" federal guarantees, and both institutions'
associated "too big to fail" status, Fannie and Freddie were all the more
able to attract plenty of purchasers of their securities.
Ultimately, of course, all of this landed Fannie and Freddie in very hot
water. The real estate slump that commenced in the summer of 2006 hit
them especially hard, for they held the great bulk of low-end mortgages.2 7'
We know where it led: Fannie and Freddie were ultimately renationalized
in September of 2008.272 Many took this for an ominous sign, on all fours
with the totterings of Bear Steams, Countrywide, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, AIG, and Washington Mutual, among others.273 What we
ought really to see in the renationalization of Fannie and Freddie,
however, is opportunity. And restoration of home values, home-owning,
and finance. That takes us on to the solution of our present crisis. For in
effect, what we have now-with the unregulated "mortgage bank"
industry wiped out and Fannie and Freddie restored-is our original 1930s
package again, under one roof.
Here is the key, I believe, to solving our current problems. The restored
FHA, Fannie, and Freddie team can quickly address the short-term side of
our trouble by doing their original jobs and thus stabilizing the real estate
markets. A restored system of financial regulation, in turn-extending the

269. See, e.g., Newshour: Investigating Fannie Mae and the Housing Bubble (PBS television
broadcast Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june 10/fannie_04-

09.html.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.

272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets
and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpI129.htm.
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system we put into place in the 1930s to new fields of finance currently
not regulated at all-will for its part address the longer-term problem. To
these two sets of coordinated solutions, we now turn.
IV. HOME RESTORATION: TRIAGE AND LONGER-TERM MAINTENANCE

Let us begin by recalling that there are two salient components of the
present crisis. Then we shall see two solutions before us: one short-term,
the other longer-term.
A. Still-Life of andfor the PresentMoment
The first, "core" component of the present crisis as related in Part II.B
is the doubtful value of an uncertain number of subprime mortgages and
associated MBSs. These are held in varying quantities by a large number
of financial institutions (FIs) worldwide, many of which appear not as yet
fully to have reported the sizes of their holdings. These securities,
moreover, as noted above, underlie financial derivative commitments on
the part of yet more FIs worldwide, with notional values that appear
likewise as yet to be underreported. The MBSs, for their part, are now
widely perceived to be "toxic" because many-though certainly not all
and, indeed, not even a majority--of the mortgages backing them are
troubled.274
Now, as we have seen, many of the mentioned mortgages are troubled
because they were imprudently or, in some cases, "predatorily" extended
by participants in the shadow industry of scarcely regulated "mortgage
banks" that developed and then grew in the vacuum left by those S&Ls
lost in the 1990s. 275 These institutions proliferated rapidly with, while

274. To be more fine-grained, MBSs associated with a particular pool of mortgages are typically
divided into three or more tranches. The largest tranche generally comprises the least risky, hence
lowest return, stream of payments, often accounting for 70% of a pool's nominal value. See, e.g.,
MORRIS, supra note 15. The next tranche typically comprises a slightly more risky, hence slightly
higher return, stream of payments, and accounts for 20% of the pool's nominal value. Id. The final
tranche, typically accounting for 10% of the pool's nominal value, comprises the most risky, but also,
of course, highest yield, stream of payments. This tranche is colorfully said to include the pool's "toxic
waste." Id. The "toxic" MBSs are of course principally associated with this tranche of most pools. But
as I shall note further below, as confidence is lost, one tranche's "toxicity" comes to taint, in
perception, other tranches as well.
275. The network of S&Ls, fostered by President Hoover in the early 1930s to revitalize real
estate markets and further developed by President Roosevelt thereafter to the same end, was done-in
by the LBO-fueling junk bond craze of the later 1980s, made possible by the Reagan Administration's
and Congress's elimination of previously tight regulation of S&L investment practices. ERisk Case
Study, supra note 267.
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indeed helping to fuel, our recent Fed-enabled real estate bubble.276 Naive,
non-credit-checked, and in some cases clearly uncreditworthy borrowers
not only received loans from these institutions, but often were lured with
ARMs, featuring low front-end "teaser" payments
offers of newfangled 277
that later "ballooned.,
Now, ordinarily, neither borrowers nor lenders would likely have
expected anything good to come of loans on such terms as those I have
described. But fees, risk-transferability, and especially speculative asset
bubbles, as discussed above in Part II, have a funny way of changing
people's calculations. Borrowers not unreasonably assume that they can
regularly refinance inexpensively, on the strength of the underlying
collateral's apparently inexorable appreciation. Primary and secondary
lenders naturally assume likewise. And again, such assumptions seem far
from far-fetched while the bubble is growing.
Now for a time in these cases, everyone does indeed win. The process
takes on the self-fulfillingly prophetic, spontaneous "chain letter" or
Ponzi-like character of our model sketched in Part II.A. More are drawn
into the market as prices keep rising. Some hope to clear speculative
profits by "flipping" the assets they borrow to buy. Others, more
innocently perhaps, reasonably judge that they can prudently purchase to
hold, but on more highly levered terms than they might otherwise have
accepted. And still others are mixed cases of holder-cum-speculator. 278 In
all cases, in any event, as the new entrants keep entering, the prices do
keep rising, in effect validating the judgments of those who act upon the
expectation of continued ascent.
But, of course, bubbles never grow indefinitely; the inflection point
always is reached. The Ponzi growth rate slows at some point in the
indefinite medium term-whatever the more definite, long-term trend

276. There seems to be growing consensus that the Fed kept lending rates too low over most of the
1990s and early-mid-2000s. A charitable interpretation is that it understandably overshot in addressing
the slowdowns first threatened by the S&L, Asian financial, and Russian debt default crises of the
1990s, then indeed occasioned by the deflation of the tech bubble in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks of 2001.
There are, of course, also less charitable interpretations. See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN,
supra note 140; Paul Krugman, Greenspan's Bubbles, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=926409.
277. See, e.g., SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supranote 9, at 6-8.
278. Those who borrow with a view to buying homes that they will actually occupy buy more
expensive homes, for example-their down payments, in turn, constituting smaller portions of the total
to be paid. Others borrow with a view to purchasing homes that they intend all along to "flip" at a
profit. Still others are actuated by motives that combine the first two, perhaps planning to continue
residing in the home if appreciation rates slow, and to "flip" the home or "trade up" should
appreciation continue apace.
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lines might be, as credit limits are eventually closed in upon. 27 9 When that
happens, the spontaneous Ponzi process abruptly halts and then quickly
reverses. The reason is that there are no more new entrants to finance
continued growth in the value of previous entrants' holdings, while it has
been precisely on the strength of such anticipated growth that entrants
have increased their debt burdens. The buildup of worry--"how long can
this continue?"--accordingly discharges at last. The "Minsky Moment" is
reached. 280 Now, many erstwhile winners, having been nervously mindful
all along that a peak followed by mass exit must at some point be reached
once the credit runs out, seek to salvage gains or cut losses by being first
to jump ship. It is a bank-run-reminiscent scenario. But in modem,
electronically traded markets, the time span between first and last is paperthin. Prices plunge quickly, and with them the reliability of those
repayment obligations associated with the credit extensions that enabled
the rise.
This, of course, is the fate that befell our own housing bubble. Prices
leveled off, then began falling in mid-2006. 281 The ensuing slump quickly
began to throw ill-structured, bubble-time mortgages into default, as
market valuations of underlying assets began falling below nominal debt
283
obligations. 28 2 Default rates, not surprisingly, have since grown steadily.
And as they have grown, the market values of mortgages, mortgagebacked securities, and associated derivative obligations have dropped yet
further.284 In effect, the same feedback loop structure that characterized the
buildup now characterizes the comedown-for "run-ups," we have seen,
just are "runs" in reverse.
The second, penumbral component of our mortgage-rooted financial
crisis accordingly is, no pun intended, derivative in character. It is masspsychological, simply the flipside of the just-described Ponzi process.
Something much like the proverbial "market for lemons" known to
macroeconomists since at least the time of Akerlof's and Stiglitz's

279. This seems the right place to trot out the inevitable quotation of Keynes, to the effect that "in
the long run, we're all dead." We might also liken things here to a sort of reversal of Al Gore's
frequent observation that this year's being cooler than last year constitutes no refutation of long-term
global warming. The trend-line's sloping upward over the long haul does not prevent its being jagged
over long enough periods to be either misleading (in the case of climate change skeptics) or
devastating (in the case of investment naifs).
280. The reference is, of course, to HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY
(1986), a work that seems unsurprisingly to be enjoying a bit of a rediscovery.
281. See MORRIS, supranote 15.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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canonical contributions of the early 1970s and 1980s (for which, of course,
both won Nobels 28 5), and to financiers since Gresham first postulated the
"Law" bearing his name, follows many a burst bubble. 286 The prevailing
mood changes, tendencies toward risk aversion are heightened, and
uncertainties are resolved by assuming the worst rather than the best.
In the present iteration of this depressingly familiar story, no
institutions or persons know precisely what portions of their own MBSholdings (or derivative positions tied positively to MBS values) will prove
"underperforming" in consequence of the mortgage industry's post-crash
troubles. That is partly because no one knows precisely which mortgages
will foreclose, thus which securities will prove underperforming or how
much. And it is partly because no one knows how low particular property
values, or property values more generally, will fall. And finally, it is partly
because property values, hence mortgage and thus MBS and derivative
values, are themselves partly determined by whatever action we
collectively take or do not take to prevent defaults. There is a significant
element of self-fulfilling prophecy in whatever we do here, just as there
was self-fulfilling prophecy in the growth of the Ponzi-like bubble itself.
And so until action on the part of the collectivity is taken by some agent
authorized to act in the name of all, each private party assumes the worst
and seeks exit.
This self-fulfilling prophecy piece of the story, for its part, steadily
radiates outward. The market grows ever more jittery over the justenumerated uncertainties. The longer these jitters endure, the more prone
investors become to undervalue affected financial institutions' MBSincluding or MBS-derived portfolios, and hence, ultimately, those
institutions' own issuances. The more they in consequence shed their
stakes in these institutions, in turn, the more quickly the remaining such
stakes lose their short-run values. In effect, there's a "run on the banks," in
this case by shareholders rather than depositors-as used to happened
before there was federal deposit insurance. The negative feedback loop
found in the market for MBSs accordingly spreads beyond those
securities, both to derivative contracts and to the obligations of firms that
are heavily invested in these securities. The familiar financial "contagion"
ensues.
The process is aided and abetted by mark-to-market accounting rules
that require institutions to value their assets as the market values them-

285. Id.
286. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 20.
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even when, thanks to the panic psychology at work here, the market
arguably is grossly undervaluing them. And with affected institutions in
turn interlinked by collateralized debt obligations, credit-default swaps,
and other derivative risk-sharing arrangements, even those not holding
MBSs end up affected. The "downward spiral" winds steadily downward.
But what goes down can be turned back up and brought to a much more
sustainable stratum.
Enter here FHA and its GSE siblings: We can reverse the widening
downward spiral that is this crisis's penumbral component, as Treasury's
original late September 2008 plan itself contemplated, by directly
addressing the cause at its core-the bad mortgages and the securities they
back.287 And this is precisely what FHA and its newly renationalized GSEs
originally were and are for, as just seen in Part III.
With FHA still in operation as the sole federal agency that operates at
no cost to the public fisc, and with its prodigal siblings now back in the
family, we are actually now very well situated to address the mortgage
crisis at the core of our imminent global financial crisis. Indeed, we can
easily set the team to work in a manner a lot like the manner in which it
operated in solving that real estate crisis that prompted its founding in the
first place. Here is how to do it.
B. Home Repair: Triagefor the Near Term
Solving our present crisis requires both triage for the immediate crisis
and longer-term preventive maintenance to prevent a recurrence. Here, I
treat the former by laying out two complementary tasks to be discharged
by FHA and its newly renationalized GSE siblings. Then in Part IV.C, I
address the longer term.
1. Fannieand Freddie:FirstClean Up the Secondary Market
The first thing we must do is, through the now once again refederalized
GSEs, employ recovered TARP moneys to purchase and repurchase
perceivedly "troubled" MBSs from key financial institutions now holding
them, as originally envisaged by Treasury. Fannie and Freddie can then
add them to the large numbers of such securities that they already once

287. Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Emergency Economic Stablization Act of 2008
(Sept. 28, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/appstist/press/financialsvcs-dem/press092808.
shtml; see also TroubledAsset Relief Program (TARP), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terns/t/troubled-asset-relief-program-tarp.asp (last visited May 18, 2010).
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again hold. We should pay more than currently undervalued market value,
but lower than discounted cash flow value. That way, value will be
recouped as MBSs rise back to less panic-depressed values. And that way,
we will lso ensure that financial institutions that overinvested in MBSs
incur some cost, thereby mitigating the moral hazard concerns occasioned
by any bailout. In effect, we will be taking a "deductible," or conferring
the attributes of "coinsurance" on the bailout.
How much more than currently undervalued market-but lower than
discounted cash flow-value, should we pay out? Many methods have
been proposed, the best known among them probably the "reverse
auction" first proposed by Treasury in September of 2008.288 Reverse
auctioning certainly seems the most efficient means of dividing the surplus
that we will be recouping. But we shall do best to prescind here from finetuned accounting and valuation matters, however, as there is surely a range
of reasonable possibilities within which to choose. What matters for the
present is that MBSs are substantially undervalued at present by a spooked
market, for the same psychological reasons that account for their having
been overvalued by our erstwhile euphoric market. And this fact itself, if
there is more or less symmetry between first the euphoric and then the
dejected "animal spirits" that have been at work in the MBS market this
decade, suggests somewhere near the mean between peak and trough rates
as a good working benchmark against which to check observed auction
rates, perhaps marginally adjusted in recognition of any asymmetry
thought to be worked by endowment or related effects.
Will the MBSs rise back to higher values as suggested? Yes, for
reasons rooted in the "market for lemons" and "self-fulfilling prophecy"
phenomena noted above and just mentioned again. The problem in this
case is that, while we know that only a small minority of mortgages will
actually default and that only a minority of MBSs will actually prove to be
"toxic," we do not know which ones. During those periods of irrational
despair that follow periods of irrational exuberance, individuals
irrationally fear that they are holding the underperforming investments
disproportionately. Let's call it a "reverse Wobegon" problem: Each
individual worries, "I might have only the bad ones.' 289 Fearing this
individually, they then, in effect, make it so collectively, by stampeding to
sell what they irrationally undervalue. In short, we have a classic
collective action problem, one that in this case artificially deflates value.

288. Press Release, supra note 287.
289. The allusion, of course, is to Garrison Keillor's proverbial town of Lake Wobegon, where
"all of the children are above average."

1280

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:1213

Concentrate ownership of the full affected portfolio, then, and we
address this collective action problem head on and entirely solve it. Each
security then can effectively be valued at the mean, without anyone having
to know which particular securities in fact possess more or less than mean
value. The problem of individuals all fearing that they hold securities of
less than mean value-the "reverse Wobegon problem'"-is immediately
solved. We restore full portfolio value, in short, precisely by concentrating
ownership of the full portfolio, booking the difference between that and
the current irrationally depressed market value of dispersed securities.
Concentrating ownership also, it happens, will facilitate smooth operation
of the second part of the FHA/GSE plan that I am proposing, the part that
restores value to underlying mortgages themselves. On, then, to that.
2. FHA: Restore Orderto the PrimaryMarket
The second and complementary part of the short-term side of the plan
is this: Through FHA, we should simultaneously arrange refinancing and
financial counseling for those mortgagees who, owing to poorly structured
or misleadingly packaged mortgages, are now going under. We should
make a priority of first-time, single-home buyers who have purchased the
homes to occupy them, and who might realistically pay for them if only
their payment structures are smoothed. We should show less solicitude for
"second" or "nth" homes that clearly are speculative properties purchased
for "flipping," unless there is a good chance of saving foreclosure costs by
refinancing. And we can show intermediate solicitude for those who,
though not strictly speculators, have nonetheless grossly overreachedhelping to refinance some, while gradualizing workouts and foreclosures
on others. FHA is quite experienced with all of these options and more.
Note that all of this can be done at a reasonable, unforced pace once
FHA's sibling GSEs have purchased or repurchased the great bulk of
MBSs per the first part of the plan. For the newly renationalized GSEs do
not face the same short-term financial imperatives as private lenders. Nor
do they face the bargaining problems that confront dispersed classes of
creditors in more garden-variety insolvency situations. For, yes, debt
workouts, too, are familiarly a collective action problem, as any
bankruptcy expert will readily attest.2 90 This, then, is yet another benefit of
concentrating ownership of these now-troubled assets in the hands of our
GSEs. And it will enhance the value of the assets themselves, precisely by
290. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Locic AND LIMITS OF BANKRuPTcy LAW (1986).
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preventing massive foreclosures and their associated costs, and thus
preserving the value of those mortgages that underlie the presently "toxic"
MBSs.
It bears noting here, while we're at it, that FHA can affect mortgage
refinancings much more efficiently than judges or any new cadre of
bankruptcy trustees of the sort that some are proposing would do. For one
thing, this is because, again, refinancing is already an FHA specialty. But
for another thing, it is because the GSEs' repurchasing of MBSs will
eliminate the usual holdout problems that afflict ordinary debt workouts in
the vicinity of court-administered bankruptcy. I think that this renders the
paired FHA/GSE plan superior, moreover, to Professor Shiller's proposal
for a new HOLC. 291 For the latter would not only just recreate an agency
that FHA was itself instituted to replace and make permanent, but also
would not yield the concentrated MBS-ownership advantages that this
plan involves.
Offer to buy troubled MBSs, then, and many, if not most, who now
hold them will sell. Then, we can refinance mortgages with speed, but
with deliberate speed-without pressure. As for any who do not sell their
MBSs per the plan, note first that they would have to constitute one-third
of the mortgage credit outstanding on any one home if they wished to
block refinancing. That seems unlikely. Note finally that if, improbably,
they were to constitute such a bloc and then seek to obstruct refinancing
arrangements by FHA, there would surely be sufficient ground for the
government to exercise its eminent domain power and pay the amount
paid to the last--or, indeed, even the first-voluntary sellers of MBSs to
the holdouts. A securities covenant is no more a suicide pact than is the
Constitution, and there is no reason whatever to honor exploitative holdout
power in times of exigency like the present. If anything, there is reason to
shame holdouts publicly, along with the worst of that comparative
minority of borrowers and lenders who were grossly negligent in the midst
of the bubble.
So how much, then, will all of this cost? That is, of course, hard to say,
in view of the feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies that we have noted
to be at work in the present crisis. The best we can reasonably expect at

291. Professor Shiller's proposal is made in SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 9. A
similar plan, proposed by Congressman Frank and Senator Dodd, was put forth in 2007, but withdrawn
in the face of opposition by industry groups, Republicans in Congress, and the Bush Administration.
The Dodd/Frank plan would have employed FHA, but--proposed as it was before Fannie and Freddie
had been renationalized--did not involve GSE's sweeping of troubled MBSs from the market. Now
that we have the full team together again, prospects look better.
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the present, I think, is to take cognizance of the range of reasonably
anticipated possibilities. At one end of this range is the possibility that
FHA and its renationalized GSE siblings will actually come out in the
black. Certainly that is what happened from the late 1930s onward, when
the original package was first put into place.292 And, indeed, it is why
Fannie was ultimately privatized, and it is why FHA has operated at a
profit since its inception. It also bears noting that Messrs Bernanke, Bush,
and Paulson themselves argued that TARP, in light of the market's thenundervaluing of MBSs-even without the salvaging of mortgage, hence
MBS values-could ultimately bring a net gain to the fisc; the
government
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How about the less rosy end of the range of possibilities? That one is
just a bit harder to estimate. This owes, in part, to the aforementioned
feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies. It owes also to the countervailing
effects of the aforementioned MBS-appreciation apt to be wrought by
concentrated ownership on the one hand, and the MBS-depreciation apt to
be wrought by continued home-value decline and foreclosures on the other
hand. Worst case scenario, one supposes, would be that the full amount
spent purchasing troubled MBSs would be lost. One hastens to add,
however, that this worst-case scenario seems far from plausible, for all of
the reasons adduced above.
C. Home Maintenance: Carefor the Long Term
Particularly in view of the nature of the present crisis, as well as of its
predecessor crisis of the 1930s, the short-term solution proposed in Part
II.B should bring an expeditious halt to our immediate difficulties. This
raises an anterior question, however: How do we prevent a recurrence?
The answer, I believe, lies in two clues. The first clue is the model of
asset price bubbles and bursts laid out in Part II, of which our present
crisis is a textbook case. The second clue lies in that broader system of
financial regulation, described in Part III, which the Hoover and Roosevelt
era Congresses enacted as a complement to the home-finance programs
put into place in the same era. For, as seen above, partial dismantling of
that system played a critical role in enabling our recent stock and then real
estate bubbles.

292. See supra Part !11.
293. George W. Bush, President, Speech to the Nation on the Economic Crisis (Sept. 24, 2008),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/economy/24text-bush.htm]?pagewanted= .
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In this Subpart, then, I turn to a brief sketch of "reforms"-or rather,
restorations-to our system of financial regulation that will complement
the restorations just sketched to our system of mortgage finance.
Completing the package in this way will restore us to longer term financial
health of the kind that we enjoyed nearly uninterrupted from the later
1930s to the mid-1990s.
1. Regulation as Modulation: The Fed and Bubble Preemption
Easily the most important lesson to be drawn from the model of asset
price bubbles and bursts schematized in Part II.A, I think, is the critical
role that the Fed must play in preventing bubbles from emerging and
inflating in the first instance. There are two principal reasons for saying
this.
The first reason is that, as observed in Part II.B, all other forms of
regulation, as well as self-help, tend to break down when a bubble is
inflating. The reason for that is now obvious: While asset prices are rising,
the risk measures, according to which risk regulators operate and private
parties decide on courses of action, decline. When assets are more highly
valued, it is easier for financial institutions to comply with their debt
obligations. It is likewise easier for borrowers to collateralize. And it is
easy for everyone to feel safer than they actually are.
The second reason to emphasize the Fed's role is that, as observed in
Part II.A, asset price bubbles are collective action problems. There need be
no individual irrationality or rascality for a bubble to begin and inflate.
Nor need there be any inefficiency on the part of the market when it comes
to impounding price-relevant information into the prices of assets. The
problems upon which bubbles depend, rather, are first the absence of
relevant information-which can itself be the product of a collective
action problem, as I will explain presently-and second the absence of a
collective actor to act on behalf of the dispersed actors. The needed
information, for its part, is in the nature of a public good, which will tend
accordingly to be underprovided by private actors; its absence, in other
words, is itself partly the product of a collective action problem. The
needed action, for its part, is not only information assembling, but also
coordinative in character; it is a matter of solving an information problem
and a prisoner's dilemma.
Both of these roles are Fed roles, the Fed being the nearest we have to a
"systemic risk regulator." It is for the Fed to assemble the information
required to determine whether asset prices are inflating, "Beautiful Baby"style, beyond levels explicable by underlying, "fundamental" value. It is
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likewise for the Fed, as the "designated driver," to tighten up on available
credit and loose money when individuals begin acting in manners that,
although individually rational, are collectively irrational in the "positivefeedback," "Ponzi-process" manner.
Can the Fed do that? If the model layed out in Part II is correct, then
yes, it certainly can. The Fed, from the late 1980s until recently, failed to
act, one suspects, owing to a misconception on the part of its principal
officers. That misconception sometimes was stated in the form of a claim
to the effect that bubbles are not detectable until after they burst. 294 Other
times, it has been stated in the form of a claim to the effect that, since
bubble behavior is irrational and inefficient, while long-term irrationality
and inefficiency cannot be plausibly attributed to asset markets, bubbles
cannot actually occur.29 5
But neither of these claims is correct. The model in Part II.A shows
where the second claim comes a cropper. And the tables presented in Part
II.B show where the first claim goes wrong. While, of course, it is not easy
to separate out "fundamental" value and "merely speculative" value with
scalpel-like precision or an entirely bright line, it is often quite easy to find
reasonable proxies for fundamental value and then to compare prevailing
market prices to them. When home prices depart as significantly from
counterpart rental prices and from building costs, as Figures 4 and 5 above
show that they did in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there simply cannot
be serious doubt that a bubble is afoot. Like remarks hold for the P/E ratio
and stock price comparisons called to attention by Shiller and others in
regard to our stock markets during the mid- to late 1990S.296
Moreover, there are other ways, at least in potential, to draw a bead on
the point at which markets have shifted into bubble territory. As John
Geanakoplos has argued persuasively for over a decade now, as well as
partly corroborated, speculative asset price bubbles correlate closely to
growth in economy-wide leverage. That is to say, collaterization
requirements drop and, what amounts to the same thing, loan-to-value
ratios rise sharply during speculative asset price bubbles.29 7 Geanakoplos's
work can be viewed as an updating of Irving Fisher's "debt deflation"

294. See, e.g., GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE, supra note 56, at 137.
295. See supra notes 35, 65 and accompanying text; see also supra note 56 (discussing the
undetectability of bubbles).
296.

See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9.

297. See, e.g., John Geanakoplos, Promises, Promises, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING
COMPLEX SYSTEM 285, 285-320 (Brian Arthur et al. eds., 1997); John Geanakoplos, The Leverage
Cycle (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Geanakoplos, The Leverage
Cycle].
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account of depressions.298 Against the backdrop of the model laid out in
Part II, it is easy to see why this would be the case; growth in loan-tovalue ratios would be an obvious reflection of lenders' betting, in effect,
on continued capital gains on the part of their borrowers. Ironically-and
to this Article's way of thinking, tragically-however, no public authority
tracks economy-wide leverage ratios, while no private institution has
enforceable access to the necessary data. 299 That is why, by the way,
Geanakoplos has been able only "partly," as I just put it, to corroborate his
claims; he has had access only to leverage data concerning securities in
respect of which his own hedge fund has taken positions.30 0
In sum, then, just as Part IV.B has just proposed that Fannie and
Freddie act for the collectivity now in solving that collective action
problem that is the market's mass-undervaluation of MBSs, so should the
Fed act for the collectivity in the longer term to solve those paired
collective action problems that are the market's occasional massovervaluation of assets, partly in consequence of missing bubble-relevant
information. Collective action problems demand collective actors. And
when it comes to finance, the Fed-or perhaps, in the near future, the Fed
as supplemented by a new "Systemic Risk Council"-is our principal such
actor.30 1
How, precisely, might the Fed's taking this role seriously again lead to
what I have called "modulation?" There are several ways. First,
assembling and publicizing information of the kinds that I have just cited
would enable private actors themselves to act in ways that would tend to
modulate asset price swings. For those swings, as I have modeled them,
occur against a backdrop of "radical," "Knightian" uncertainty that
information of the sort that I have just noted will tend to displace. With the
availability of such information, risk-averse investors would be less
inclined to go long on assets in respect of which bubbles would otherwise
form, and lenders would be less inclined to extend credit to them-at least
to do so without requiring more in the way of collateral, interest, or both.
By the same token, more actors would be incentivized to go short-to
bet against-continued asset price rises. For they would now possess
sufficient information to appreciate more fully the sense in which-and

298. For Fisher's "debt inflation" account of depressions, see supra note 114.
299. See Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, supra note 297.
300. See id.; see also Whitehouse, supranote 174.
301. The "Systemic Risk Council" idea figures in the Dodd proposal before the U.S. Senate at the
time of this writing. See Robert Hockett, Senator Dodd's Proposed Finance-Regulatory 'Overhaul',
Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/03/senator-dodds-proposed-finance.html.
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the timing with which-a bubble is underway and apt, before long, to
reach its erstwhile radically uncertain endpoint.
Second, and relatedly, any inadequacy in private rates of betting
against bubbles could readily be supplemented by regulatory action. For
one thing, of course, the Fed now would have means of better timing their
boosting of the market rate of interest, the credit-dampening margin
requirements imposed upon financial institutions, or both. For another
thing-and here we would be speaking not simply of the Fed, but the IRS
working in cooperation with the Fed-we could readily impose a form of
"Tobin taxation" on the capital gains realized by those who "flip" assets
like houses during times of speculative excess, as now would be newly
determinable by the Fed. In effect, such a measure would address from the
capital gains side precisely what increased interest rates or margin
requirements would address from the leverage side-viz., the spread that
dramatically grows between borrowing costs and capital gains during any
credit-fueled asset price bubble.3 °2
It bears noting, before I turn to my other recommendations, that bubble
preemption can even be viewed as a straightforward extension of the Fed's
statutory inflation-prevention ("stable prices") mandate. 0 3 For, in light of
the discussion of asset price bubbles above in Part II, what is such a
bubble if not an instance of "hyperinflation"? All that differs between
consumer price hyperinflations and asset price bubbles is the underlying
item--consumer goods in the one case, financial assets in the other. This
feeds directly into several more incremental, but complementary,
regulatory measures that we now would do well to undertake with a view
to our longer-term financial well-being.
2. Portfolio Regulation by Reference to Underlying Assets
Asset markets' overvaluation of assets during times of speculative
excess, and their undervaluation of such assets during times of
symmetrical "depressive" excess, are problem enough in themselves. But
their harmful effects are transmitted more widely when assets are valued
by regulators-not just the Fed, but other financial regulators as well-and
private institutions by reference to market value. So-called "market value"

302. Tobin taxes, which are transaction taxes placed upon chuming-

r in recent housing market

language, "flipping"-assets of the sort characteristic of "speculation," as distinguished from "value
investing," of course originate with James Tobin. See James Tobin, A Proposalfor International
Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978). A helpful collection of essays on Tobin taxation is THE
TOBIN TAX: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds., 1996).

303.

12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2006).
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and "mark-to-market" accounting-employed by our financial regulators,
our rating agencies, and many other institutions alike, as seen in Part II.B
and IV.A-played a critical role in enabling our stock and real estate
bubbles to inflate. They have more recently played an equally critical role
in validating market actors' panic-rooted undervaluation of assets, again as
noted in Part IV.A.
Just as the Fed must attend to both "fundamental" and market values
associated with speculative assets, then, so must other regulators, raters,
and other financial institutions. The arguments made in the 1990s and later
for moves to "market value accounting" and like methodologies on the
part of the FDIC and other regulators and raters are fair enough. 304 Indeed,
it is obvious why market measures should be among those employed in
valuing assets-particularly insofar as markets do indeed tend to be
efficient impounders of price-relevant information. But it has never been
obvious why such measures should altogether supplant, rather than simply
complement, measures-by-proxy of more lasting, "fundamental" value.
The model schematized in Part II.A shows, I believe, precisely why both
should be employed. And then, when significant divergences appear
between the two kinds of measures and then grow over time, regulators,
raters, and others should be required to treat this as indicative of bubble
behavior and to tighten up leverage requirements, lending rates, and
money accordingly.
3. Derivative and Hedge FundDisclosure
Another important component of the present crisis-at least its
peripheral components-as described above is the fact that the multitude
of derivative financial arrangements pursuant to which asset price risk was
transmitted worldwide have been occluded. This is surely one of the most
remarkable and surprising features of our current finance-regulatory
environment. As any student of securities regulation knows, the leading
strategy adopted by Congress in the 1930s for purposes of securities
regulation was that of disclosure. 0 5 Then, private actors and regulators
alike are more readily able to determine where and when further inquiry
must be made.
Our securities-regulatory disclosure regime, however, has never been
extended to derivative transactions. And, in consequence, these
transactions are still counted as "off-balance-sheet activities." Up through

304. See supra note 60 on controversies over market-value accounting.
305. See supra note 266.
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the mid-1990s, there might arguably have been reason for this. Derivative
transactions were, well, derivative-they were, at most, the tail on the dog
of securities. Moreover, in view of their salutary risk-hedging and
consequent market-completing properties, there might have been reason to
give them a temporary pass for a time, to enable their use to proliferate
and grow.
But that growth has long since occurred, and the once-tail now very
much wags the dog. Leaving them off of the balance sheet guarantees that
our financial system will be kept off-balance. The time for giving
derivatives a full pass has long since passed. None of this is to say that
derivative arrangements ought to be impeded, much less prohibited. It is
only to say that they ought to be regulated as other securities long have
been regulated-through required disclosure and explicit manipulativeactivity prevention. This should be-and happily, in at least some form,
now seems apt to be-at the top of the new Congress's "to do" list.30 6 I
will now mention two more measures, in passing, before I conclude.
4. A Glass-SteagallforAuditors, RatingAgencies, andRegulators
As is well known, a conspicuous bit of regulatory reform that came
with Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999 was the express repeal of GlassSteagall. °7 Banks now are able to affiliate with securities firms, as well as
insurance companies, with abandon. A single financial holding company
may hold multiple such firms. And the practice of "stapled finance"whereby affiliates advertise their services to one another's clients in
brochures that travel together as package deals--ensures that customers
know of all siblings.3 °8 It is, of course, possible that all of this will have to
be, or at any rate will be, revisited in the aftermath of our present crisis. I
shall abstain from opining on this for present purposes, however, as there
are other separation walls that it is much easier to say confidently that we
ought to impose.
In essence, there are two conspicuous conflicts of interest that
proliferate right now and are clearly germane to the integrity of our
financial system. One is the case of auditors and rating agencies. These
reputational intermediaries are retained and paid by the very financial
firms that they audit and rate. And significant evidence already is

306. See Hockett, supra note 301.
307. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
308. See MORRIS, supra note 15, on "staple finance".
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emerging that some of these intermediaries have been lax in rating many
of our recently worst-hit financial institutions. 0 9 A related conflict is that
raised by the practice of many financial regulators-not to say Members
of Congress-who pursue careers with financial institutions after brief
careers regulating them.
Now, these are "large issues" that deserve separate Articles in their
own right. That seems particularly so in light of the expense that would
likely be occasioned by assigning the tasks of auditing and rating to
government agencies. Nevertheless, it would seem that something in the
way of imposition of walls of separation here could be managed at little
public cost. It would not be at all difficult, for example, simply to prohibit
former regulators from taking positions with financial firms for some
lengthy period-say five years or more-following their stints in office.
By the same token, it would not be that difficult to impose upon financial
firms, as a sort of licensing cost, fees of the sort that they pay auditors and
raters, with a view then to publicly paying those intermediaries. A slightly
less fundamental measure that might offer some of the same benefits
would be to impose a wall of anonymity between rating agenices and
those whom they rate, even when the latter pay for the ratings. Measures
of this sort would nicely complement those more critical measures
proposed just above.3 10
5. OriginatorLiability
As a final complementary regulatory measure recommended by the tale
told in Parts II.B and IV.A, it is tempting to suggest that we return full
circle to where we were circa 1995, by extending some features of that
regulatory regime to which we subject depository institutions, to the
industry of so-called "mortgage banks." As noted above, this industry
grew in the vacuum left by failed thrift institutions in the early 1990s. It
was left unregulated and played a critical role in originating the bulk of the
mortgages that have gone bad since 2006. Yet, in view of the model
sketched in Part II-and of the historical correlation between protracted
economic slumps on the one hand, and combined stock and real estate
bubbles on the other-it is very puzzling, indeed, that we permitted this.

309. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Comprehensive Reforms to
Bring Increased Transparency to Credit Rating Process (June 11, 2008), availableat http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2008/2008-1 10.htm.
310. At the time of this editing, the New York Times had come out strongly in favor of some such
measure. See Editorial, What About the Raters?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at WK9.
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We do not, after all, permit manicurists and pizza delivery companies to
underwrite or sell securities. Why, then, did we permit them to originate
mortgages-a form of asset at least as critical to wealth and the health of
the macroeconomy?
The final reform that I take our present troubles to show critical, then,
is just this: Recognize once and for all that real estate finance is as critical
as is corporate finance, and regulate markets in these assets accordingly.
That might be the most crucial lesson learned by the Hoover and
Roosevelt Administrations in the 1930s. It is also a lesson that we have
had ample time to relearn in connection with Japan's, then Sweden's, and
then East Asia's experiences over the course of the 1990s. Get as serious
about regulating entry into these markets as we are about entry into
banking and securities markets, then, and perhaps we won't have to learn
the lesson again.
V. CONCLUSION: THE HOUSE AS RESTORED

To our detriment, we have forgotten the link between combined stock
and real estate bubbles and bursts on the one hand, and protracted
economic contraction on the other. To our detriment, we have also
forgotten that stock and real estate bubbles can be detected while forming
and pricked before growing. Finally, to our detriment, we have forgotten
how the new systems of real estate finance and financial regulation put
into place in the 1930s operated precisely to stabilize real estate and
broader financial markets, and to prevent subsequent bubbles and bursts
for over sixty years.
This Article has accordingly been, in a manner, a sort of remembrance.
But its backward look has been conducted with a forward-looking
purpose. The model that I have offered of asset price bubbles and bursts
shows the shared structure of past and present, and the reason, in
consequence, that updating old measures-measures that we have already
begun to bring back with the renationalization of Fannie and Freddie last
August-can bring new prosperity.
At literally no ultimate cost to the public fisc, FHA and its GSE
siblings-Fannie and Freddie-cured our last real estate crisis. In so
doing, they transformed us from a nation in which fewer than 40% owned
their homes, to a nation in which 70% do. And all the while, new systems
of bank and securities regulation-relying largely on easily administered
disclosure, firewall, and entry-regulatory strategies-ensured that the
broader financial system operated safely as well.
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Since FHA remains both self-funding and best at what it does, and
since the GSEs now have been refederalized in keeping with their original,
pre-privatization mandates, their complementary original missions can
now be restored. Their mandates are clear, are constitutional, and still can
be more or less costlessly accomplished. They exist to spread and maintain
nonspeculative home-ownership on Main Street. Set them to work on that
now, and we will save Wall Street-and the global financial system-as
well.
Meanwhile, restore and extend our broader system of financial
regulation so as to track and prevent bubbles-both at their origins and at
all points of support-and we will keep them safe.

